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THE CIRCULAR LOGIC OF ACTAVIS
JOSHUA B. FISCHMAN*
Assessing the fairness of settlements is an inherently difficult task. Because
settlements foreclose the judicial determination of litigants’ entitlements, courts
can only compare settlements to speculative predictions about what would have
occurred in litigation. Courts can conduct full-blown inquiries into the merits
after the fact, but doing so undermines the cost-saving rationale of settlement.
In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., a case involving an antitrust challenge to a
pharmaceutical patent settlement, the United States Supreme Court adopted a
novel solution to this problem. The Court held that the terms of a patent
settlement do not need to be compared to a judicial assessment of the parties’
underlying rights as determined by patent law. Rather, the fairness of a
settlement could be inferred using economic analysis of the settlement terms
themselves; the magnitude of a payment from the patentee to the challenger
could serve as a surrogate for the weakness of the patent. In this Article, I
argue that this inference is problematic on both jurisprudential and economic
grounds. The jurisprudential critique is that Actavis implicitly relies on the
prediction theory of law—the widely disparaged conception of law as
consisting merely of predictions about what courts will do. To the extent that
the settlement terms are probative of the merits of the patent infringement case,
they reflect the parties’ expectations about the outcome of the litigation. In
using the settlement terms as a surrogate for a legal conclusion, Actavis
displaces legal reasons with predictions about court decisions. The economic
critique is that the Actavis inference fails to account for “feedback effects”
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between the court and litigants. In settling the initial patent dispute, rational
litigants will anticipate the inference that a subsequent court may draw from
their settlement, which will distort the terms of their bargain. In drawing an
inference from the settlement, a court must therefore account for the distorting
effect of its own inference.
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INTRODUCTION
In theory, settlements of legal disputes take place “in the shadow of
the law,”1 reflecting parties’ expectations about outcomes at trial. In
practice, however, settlements often deviate from the law’s shadow,
especially when the litigants have unequal bargaining power or differ in
their willingness to tolerate risk, delay, and adverse publicity.2 Attorneys
may structure settlements that prioritize their own interests over those of
the litigants,3 especially in the context of class actions.4 When legal
disputes affect third parties, litigants may also settle their disputes on
collusive terms, shifting costs to the unrepresented parties.5
As a practical matter, it is difficult for courts to identify when such
settlements are abusive. The purpose of a trial, after all, is to

1. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950, 997 (1979) (describing how legal rules
influence the private resolution of disputes).
2. See Jules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice in Settlements, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y
102, 110 (1986) (observing that settlements partly reflect “the parties’ predictions of
the likely outcome of a trial” but are also influenced by the “parties’ relative abilities
to finance a lawsuit, to tolerate delays, to withstand adverse publicity, . . . to tolerate
risk, and many other extralegal factors”); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J.
1073, 1076 (1984) (noting that parties with limited financial resources “may be less
able to amass and analyze the information needed to predict the outcome of the
litigation,” “may need the damages . . . immediately,” and may not “have the
resources to finance the litigation”).
3. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1485, 1542–45 (2009) (describing the cooperative relationship between insurance
companies and settlement mills in personal injury cases, which resolves disputes quickly
but sometimes shortchanges injured clients); Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 2, at
1078 (recognizing that “[l]awyers or insurance companies might . . . agree to
settlements that are in their interests but are not in the best interests of their clients”).
4. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1367, 1370 (1995) (describing class action settlements in which
attorneys prioritized their own interests over their clients’ interests); Samuel
Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 812 (1997) (discussing
why attorneys might prioritize their own interests in class action settlements); Susan
P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1056
(1996) (arguing that “lawyer abuse in class actions is rampant and that the current
system . . . is set up to shield lawyers from the consequences of their misdeeds”).
5. See Coleman & Silver, supra note 2, at 110 (noting that settling parties have
the ability to “spread losses among others”); Douglas Laycock, Consent Decrees Without
Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting Third Parties, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 103, 103–04
(discussing how consent decrees may impose obligations on nonconsenting third
parties); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619,
2626 (1995) [hereinafter Luban, Settlements] (“[T]wo parties trying to apportion a
loss are most likely to reach agreement if they can find a way to shift the burden to a
third party who is not present at the bargaining table.”).
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determine the parties’ legal entitlements. Because settlements
circumvent that process, they do not generate legal baselines against
which courts can compare settlement terms.6 For this reason, courts
rarely apply close scrutiny to the substantive terms of settlements.7
Recently, many economists and legal scholars have addressed the
challenges of reviewing settlements in the context of litigation
involving pharmaceutical patents.8
The Hatch-Waxman Act9
6. See Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 2, at 1082 (noting that judicial approval
of a class action settlement “turns on how close or far the proposed settlement is
from what [the judge] imagines would be the judgment obtained after suit,” and
characterizing this standard as “very odd indeed” because it is “only imagined” and
“has been constructed without benefit of a full trial”).
7. See Owen M. Fiss, The History of an Idea, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1273, 1278 (2009)
(arguing that because review of a settlement “is often made without the benefit of a
truly adversarial process,” a judge determines whether the settlement is “reasonable
or within the ballpark” and not “what justice requires”); Koniak & Cohen, supra note
4, at 1056 (criticizing courts for inadequate supervision of class action settlements);
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of Class Action Settlements, 1 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 167, 184–85 (2009) (observing that courts generally apply “lenient
scrutiny” to class action settlements and that the “rare cases” in which judges reject
settlements on substantive grounds combine “unmistakable indications of
inadequacy” with procedural violations such as a lack of “reasoned explanation,” and
“indications of unfairness” such as collusion or unequal bargaining power).
8. See, e.g., Jeremy Bulow, The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents, 4 INNOVATION
POL’Y & ECON. 145, 165 (2004) (describing ways in which patent settlements can be
anticompetitive); Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 39–40 (2009) [hereinafter Carrier, Unsettling
Drug Patent Settlements] (asserting that courts should treat pharmaceutical settlements
with reverse payments as presumptively illegal); Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in
Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA.
L. REV. 747, 750 (2002) (suggesting that courts balance various social policies when
analyzing patent settlements that include exit payments); Einer Elhauge & Alex
Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91 TEX. L. REV. 283, 292 (2012) (proposing a
test for determining the legality of patent settlements involving reverse payments); C.
Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design
Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1553 (2006) (detailing the anticompetitive effects of
“pay-for-delay” settlements and arguing that they should be presumptively illegal);
Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1720 (2003) (arguing that reverse-payment settlements should be
presumptively illegal); Marc G. Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse
Payment Fallacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1033, 1034 (2004) (claiming that arguments
“condemning reverse payments [are] incompatible with the way courts usually mete
out justice”); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391,
392 (2003) (modeling the anticompetitive effects of patent settlements and
proposing a legal standard for evaluating such settlements under antitrust law); Mark
S. Levy, Note, Big Pharma Monopoly: Why Consumers Keep Landing on “Park Place” and
How the Game Is Rigged, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 247, 263–79 (2016) (criticizing reversepayment settlements as part of a larger framework of potentially anticompetitive
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promotes pharmaceutical competition by providing incentives for the
manufacturers of generic drugs to challenge the patents of branded
drugs.10 However, if the generic firm prevails and eliminates the
patent holder’s monopoly, the firms’ joint profits will decrease
substantially. This feature of patent litigation gives the firms a strong
incentive to settle these lawsuits on collusive terms. In a typical
example of this form of settlement, the generic agrees not to
compete with the patented branded drug for much of the duration of
the patent. This arrangement allows the patent owner to continue
earning monopoly profits even in cases in which courts are likely to
find the patent invalid or not infringed. In exchange, the patent
holder shares its monopoly profits with the generic by making what is
known as a “reverse payment”11 to the generic firm.
For many years, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) challenged
these settlements on antitrust grounds, advocating a novel approach
to reviewing patent settlements. Drawing upon insights from
economic models of patent settlements, the FTC urged courts to use
economic analysis to infer that a settlement is anticompetitive from
its terms without addressing the legal merits of the underlying patent
dispute.12 Although the FTC’s argument initially had only mixed
success in the circuit courts,13 the United States Supreme Court
largely endorsed this approach in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.14 Relying on
actions, such as REMS manipulation and product hopping, that brand-name
pharmaceutical companies commit to maintain their monopolies).
9. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21,
28, 35, and 42 U.S.C.).
10. See Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 8, at 41–43
(describing how the Hatch-Waxman Act provides a 180-day period of marketing
exclusivity to a generic firm that successfully challenges a pharmaceutical patent).
11. These settlements are called “reverse payments” because, unlike standard
settlements of patent infringement cases, the patent holder (the plaintiff) pays the
alleged infringer (the defendant). See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013).
12. See, e.g., In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 987–99 (2003) (stating
the FTC’s position that an antitrust violation could be inferred from the presence of
a reverse payment and disputing that a court would need to examine the merits of
the underlying patent), vacated, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005).
13. See Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 8, at 52–59 (discussing
the holdings in four prominent antitrust cases in the circuit courts involving reversepayment settlements); Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 8, at 285–87 (characterizing
the courts of appeals prior to Actavis as being “in utter conflict on when reverse
payment settlements violate[d] antitrust law”).
14. 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013) (embracing the FTC’s argument that reversepayment settlements generate an inference of an antitrust violation, but applying the rule
of reason to such settlements instead of the FTC’s “presumptively unlawful” standard).
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this economic argument, the Court reasoned that a large payment
from the patent holder to an alleged infringer “can provide a
workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all without forcing a
court to conduct a detailed exploration of the validity of the patent
itself.”15 The Court held that a court could determine the legality of
such a settlement by comparing its terms to the litigants’ expectations
about the outcome of the patent dispute, as inferred using economic
analysis of the settlement terms themselves.16 The legality of patent
settlements is not determined by a court’s assessment of the merits,
but rather by the litigants’ predictions made in the law’s shadow.
Collusive patent settlements are undoubtedly a serious problem,
and the majority in Actavis was correct to subject such settlements to
antitrust scrutiny.17 The standard that the Court announced,
however, has generated serious confusion in the lower courts, in part
because it rests on circular reasoning. By relying on settlement terms
as a surrogate for the merits, the Court essentially ruled that lower
courts should hold that a patent is weak merely because the litigants
predicted that a court would hold that it was weak.18
This Article unpacks the reasoning underlying the Court’s holding
in Actavis and discusses how it is problematic on both jurisprudential
and economic grounds. The jurisprudential critique is that the Court
has confused the internal point of view of a judge with the external
point of view of a litigant. A settlement is based on the litigants’
predictions, made from the external point of view, about what a court
would do in the patent infringement action. A prediction about the
behavior of judges and juries cannot provide a valid legal justification
for a court, acting from the internal point of view, in determining
how to resolve the patent issues relevant to the antitrust action. By
conflating legal propositions with predictions about the actions of
judges and juries, the Court’s reasoning in Actavis relies implicitly on
the prediction theory of law, the long disparaged notion that law
consists merely of predictions about what a court will do.19

15. Id. at 2236–37.
16. Id. at 2237; see also id. at 2236 (acknowledging that some reverse-payment
settlements may reflect potential litigation costs and other services agreed to by the
generic drug firm).
17. See id. at 2227.
18. To be precise, the legal standard in Actavis depended on whether the patent
was weak in a relative sense—that is, relative to the exclusivity period stipulated in the
settlement. The Court’s holding did not require an inference that the patent was
weak in an absolute sense—that is, that it was likely to be held invalid or not infringed.
19. See infra Section II.A.
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The economic critique is that Actavis ignores the interdependence
between the litigants’ settlement and the court’s inference. The
Court is assuming that the litigants are bargaining in the shadow of
the law, but by using the reverse payment as a surrogate for the
merits, the Court is adjudicating in the shadow of their settlement. If
the parties have rational expectations, their settlement would not
simply reflect the parties’ expectations about the outcome of
litigation, but also the impact of the inference that a subsequent
court would draw from their settlement. Thus, a sophisticated court
would have to account for the two-way influences in drawing an
inference from the settlement. Drawing a correct inference would
require sophisticated economic modeling, which would be outside
the core competence of a court and arguably more challenging than
directly assessing the merits of a patent.
Although Actavis has already been described as “one of the most
important antitrust decisions in the modern era,”20 the circularity of
its logic has been overlooked, perhaps because the majority opinion
was notably vague about the rationale for its holding.21 This
circularity was further obscured because the inference originated
within a sophisticated economic model of settlement bargaining.
The various steps of the circular logic ultimately adopted by the
Court were scattered throughout a body of scholarly literature
spanning economics and law journals, and then repeated in briefs
and judicial opinions, often without careful examination of the
underlying assumptions. In adopting the economic conclusions in
this literature, the Court overlooked the critical distinction between

20. Michael A. Carrier, After Actavis: Seven Ways Forward, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV.
543, 543 (2015) [hereinafter Carrier, After Actavis]; see also Alan Devlin, Antitrust
Limits on Targeted Patent Aggregation, 67 FLA. L. REV. 775, 842 (2015) (“Actavis
fundamentally altered U.S. law governing the relationship between patents and
antitrust.”); Shubha Ghosh, Convergence?, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 95, 95 (2014)
(describing Actavis hyperbolically as “the most important pronouncement about the
relationship between patent and competition policy since the Statute of Monopolies”
(citing Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. 1 c. 3 (Eng.))).
21. See Carrier, After Actavis, supra note 20, at 543 (“Despite its significance, the
Actavis ruling was not the clearest decision ever.”); Daniel A. Crane, Actavis, the Reverse
Payment Fallacy, and the Continuing Need for Regulatory Solutions, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
51, 52 (2014) (describing Actavis as a “frustrating opinion” that “punted more than it
decided”); Joshua P. Davis & Ryan J. McEwan, Deactivating Actavis: The Clash Between the
Supreme Court and (Some) Lower Courts, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 557, 557 (2015) (noting
the Court’s failure to provide “clear guidance” in Actavis); James J. O’Connell, Editor’s
Note: The Elephant Remains, 28 A.B.A. ANTITRUST MAG., Fall 2013, at 5, 8 (noting that
Actavis failed to resolve many issues relating to reverse-payment settlements).
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economic and legal reasoning. In this sense, Actavis may be the
product of a severe interdisciplinary misunderstanding.
Part I of this Article provides a brief background on the antitrust
implications of patent settlements and discusses the Court’s decision in
Actavis. Part II then develops the jurisprudential critique of Actavis. In
essence, the Court’s reasoning relies crucially on the prediction theory
of law; the inference is only valid if one disregards the distinction
between what the law is and what litigants predict courts will do.
Although key aspects of the Court’s reasoning were ambiguous, this
critique applies to any plausible interpretation of Actavis.
Part III then introduces the economic critique: the Actavis
inference implicitly assumes that the litigants have irrational beliefs
about the economic implications of their settlement. In inferring the
parties’ beliefs from the settlement terms, the Actavis inference fails
to consider how the parties are influenced by the prospect of
antitrust liability. There is a striking irony in the premises underlying
the Court’s holding: the inference assumes that the parties are
sophisticated enough to accurately predict the outcome of patent
litigation but oblivious to the possibility of antitrust liability. The
parties’ incentives in settlement bargaining change once they become
aware that a future court may draw an inference from their
settlement. They are no longer settling in the shadow of the law; they
are settling in the shadow of the antitrust inference that a future
court will draw from their settlement. Needless to say, the inference
that a court—or any other agent—could draw from such a settlement
becomes substantially more complicated.
Part IV discusses some of the implications of this Article,
particularly with regard to challenges the lower courts face in crafting a
coherent antitrust doctrine on patent settlements. After Actavis, the
standard of legality for such settlements appears at times to depend on
patent law, but at other times on predictions about what courts will do in
patent cases. Because Actavis did not acknowledge this distinction, it
did not provide a principle to determine which standard applies.
In some cases, courts may be able to apply Actavis as a rule without
reexamining its rationale. Cases will likely arise, however, where
courts will be forced to directly confront the reasoning underlying
Actavis. In particular, courts may be called upon to clarify how the
reverse payment is serving as a surrogate and when parties are
permitted to present arguments relating to the legal merits of a
patent. Finally, Part IV concludes by briefly discussing how the
arguments developed in here apply to inferences that courts might
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draw from other economic indicators, such as stock prices, litigation
financing terms, and prediction markets.
I.

REVERSE-PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS AND THE ACTAVIS CASE

The Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis was the culmination of
years of debate among lawyers and economists about the legality of
reverse-payment settlements. This Part provides a brief overview of
the legal issues raised by reverse-payment settlements and the
economic rationale for restricting them. Section I.A begins with
background on the regulatory framework created by the HatchWaxman Act, under which most reverse-payment settlements arise.22
Section I.B discusses the economic literature on reverse payments.
Section I.C turns to antitrust issues raised by patent settlements.
Finally, Section I.D discusses the Court’s decision in Actavis.
A. The Hatch-Waxman Act
A pharmaceutical company seeking to market a new drug must
submit a New Drug Application (NDA) to the FDA, which requires
comprehensive clinical testing to ensure that the drug is safe and
effective.23 Once an NDA has been approved, the Hatch-Waxman Act
enables firms to bring generic versions of the same drug to market
through an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), which is far
less arduous.24 An ANDA requires showing that the generic version is
“bioequivalent” to the NDA-approved drug—in other words, it is used
for the same purposes and has the same active ingredients, dosage,

22. See 12 PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 338 (3d ed. 2012) (noting that
reverse-payment settlements are rare “[o]utside the context of the Hatch-Waxman
Act and pharmaceutical patent disputes”).
23. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012); see also New Drug Application (NDA), FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedan
dapproved/approvalapplications/newdrugapplicationNDA/ (last updated Mar. 29,
2016) (claiming that one of the purposes of New Drug Applications is to provide
enough information to allow the FDA to determine if a “drug is safe and effective in
its proposed use(s)”).
24. See § 355(j); see also Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA): Generics, FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopeda
ndApproved/ApprovalApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGeneric
s/default.htm (last updated Aug. 4, 2016) (“Generic drug applications are termed
‘abbreviated’ because they are generally not required to include preclinical (animal)
and clinical (human) data to establish safety and effectiveness. Instead, generic
applicants must scientifically demonstrate that their product is bioequivalent (i.e.,
performs in the same manner as the innovator drug).”).
OF
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labeling, and route of administration.25 Because the ANDA process
does not require duplicating the original, arduous testing for safety
and effectiveness, the Hatch-Waxman Act accelerates the marketing
of generic drugs and increases pharmaceutical competition.
An ANDA also requires the generic manufacturer to demonstrate
that its proposed generic drug will not infringe any patents of the
approved drug.26 The Act provides four options: the generic
company can (1) show that the approved drug is not covered by a
patent; (2) show that the relevant patent has expired;27 (3) postpone
marketing the generic version until the patent expires;28 or (4) claim
that the relevant patent is invalid or that the generic drug would not
infringe it.29 The latter option, commonly known as a “Paragraph IV”
certification, automatically constitutes an infringement of the patent
and typically provokes the patent holder to file suit against the
generic applicant.30 If the patent holder files suit within forty-five
days of the Paragraph IV certification, the FDA may not approve the
generic for a thirty-month period, allowing time for the parties to
litigate the patent.31
If the generic manufacturer is the first to file an ANDA with a
Paragraph IV certification and it prevails in showing that the patent
was invalid or not infringed, the Act provides a 180-day exclusivity
period for the generic company.32 During this exclusivity period, the
generic manufacturer will have the exclusive right to market its generic
drug and, in effect, enjoy duopoly profits. These profits, which can be
worth hundreds of millions of dollars,33 incentivize generic firms to
incur the costs of challenging patents of branded drugs.34
B. Economic Analysis of Reverse Payments
Given the expense and unpredictability of patent litigation, it is not
surprising that most infringement cases that arise within the context
of the Hatch-Waxman Act end in settlements. On the one hand,
such settlements may be socially efficient because they reduce

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

§ 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).
See § 355(b)(2)(A)(iv).
See § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(II).
See § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III).
See § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
See § 355(c)(3)(C); Hemphill, supra note 8, at 1566.
See § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
See § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
See Hemphill, supra note 8, at 1579.
Id.

FISCHMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

THE CIRCULAR LOGIC OF ACTAVIS

10/31/2016 8:16 PM

101

litigation costs. On the other hand, the litigating firms have a strong
temptation to settle their dispute on collusive terms. This arises
because patent litigation is not a zero-sum game; the firms’ combined
profits will be larger if the patent is upheld than if the patent is
invalidated. Thus, they can implicitly stipulate that the patent is likely
to be upheld and structure a settlement that allows them to divide the
monopoly profits.35
Much of the academic literature on patent settlements draws upon
an influential article by Carl Shapiro that modeled the collusive
dynamic in patent settlements.36 Shapiro explained his model using
the language of mathematical economics,37 but its intuition can be
explained using a simple numerical example. Suppose that a generic
firm is challenging a pharmaceutical patent. If the patent has ten
years remaining in its term, and the parties agree that there is a fifty
percent chance a court will deem it invalid or not infringed, then an
agreement allowing the generic to enter after five years would reflect
the parties’ expectations. Ignoring litigation costs, discounting, and
risk aversion, the patentee would expect to earn half of the monopoly
profits from the full patent term from pursuing litigation; similarly,
the challenger would expect half the generic profits from the full
patent term. If the parties are only negotiating the date of entry, the
patentee would reject any settlement that provided entry before five
years, and the challenger would reject any settlement stipulating
entry after five years. Under these assumptions, the only mutually
agreeable settlement would allow entry exactly at the five-year mark.38
The motivation for parties to include a reverse payment stems in
part from the parties’ asymmetric stakes in the litigation. Whenever
the patented drug is not subject to competition, the patentee earns
monopoly profits. Once a generic firm enters, however, competition
reduces the firms’ combined profits to a level below the monopoly
profits that the patentee earned prior to entry. The generic
35. See supra note 8.
36. See generally Shapiro, supra note 8.
37. Id.
38. Incorporating litigation costs and risk aversion would widen the settlement
window. If litigation will cost the patentee the equivalent of one year of monopoly
profits, then its expected gain from litigation would be equivalent to four years of
monopoly profits. If litigation will cost the challenger one year of generic profits,
then any settlement allowing entry between four and six years should be acceptable
to both. Risk aversion, similarly, will lead both parties to prefer a certain settlement
to the expected outcome of a trial, so that both might be willing to accept a
settlement within a somewhat wider window. How the parties would reach a
settlement within that window would depend on their respective bargaining power.
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manufacturer gains less from entry than the patentee loses; the
remaining surplus accrues to consumers, who are not represented in
the settlement. Thus, there is a strong incentive for the patentee to
pay the generic to delay entry.
To illustrate this dynamic, suppose that the patentee earns ten
million dollars per year when the drug is exclusive. Once the generic
firm enters, the patentee earns two million per year while the generic
earns one million per year. Suppose, as before, that ten years remain
in the patent term, and the parties believe there is a fifty percent
chance of invalidation. A settlement without a reverse payment
would allow entry after five years, resulting in sixty million dollars in
profit for the patentee and five million dollars for the generic.
Because the patentee gains more from delaying entry than the
generic loses, the parties can increase their joint profits with a reverse
payment. If entry were delayed from five years until seven years, the
patentee would earn an extra 16 million dollars in profit, while the
generic would forgo only two million. A reverse payment between
two and sixteen million dollars would be sufficient to induce the
generic to delay entry until seven years and increase profits for both
firms. These increased profits, of course, are extracted from
consumers, who pay monopoly prices for longer than they otherwise
would under the settlement with no reverse payment.
The above example captures the motive behind reverse payments
and the rationale for restricting them. If the parties can accurately
predict the likelihood of success at trial, a settlement without a
reverse payment would generate the same consumer surplus as they
would expect from litigation. A settlement with a reverse payment,
however, would enable the parties to extract more surplus from
consumers than they would expect from litigation.
Shapiro’s conclusion that a reverse-payment settlement is
anticompetitive does not depend on the actual validity of the relevant
patent or any judicial determination of the strength of that patent.
The model mathematically demonstrates that a reverse payment harms
consumers—relative to a settlement without a reverse payment—
irrespective of the strength of the patent. Thus, as long as the
assumptions of the model are satisfied, the model supports an
inference that a reverse-payment settlement is anticompetitive without
examining the merits of the patent.39 For this reason, the FTC and the
39. In more complex settlements, however, Shapiro acknowledged that a court
or regulator might have to directly assess the strength of the patent. See Shapiro,
supra note 8, at 397 (“[T]here does not appear to be any way around the need to
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Department of Justice (DOJ) adopted Shapiro’s approach in their
legal challenges against reverse-payment settlements.40
Shapiro’s model provides a convenient way to evaluate patent
settlements, but it relies critically on several key assumptions. Most
importantly, the model assumes that there exists a universally
accepted probability that the patent would be upheld if litigated.41
This assumption has two critical implications. First, the litigants must
agree about the likelihood that the patent will be upheld; they cannot
be overoptimistic about their prospects in litigation. This means that
there always exists a settlement without a reverse payment that would
be acceptable to both parties.
Second, the litigants’ subjective expectations must coincide with
the court’s independent assessment of the patent. By assumption,
the model eliminated the distinction between the external point of
view of the litigants and the internal point of view of the court.
Accordingly, if the court and litigants agree about the likelihood that
a patent will be upheld, then the court’s perception of the law will
coincide with the litigants’ prediction about what the court would do.
In addition, the model assumes that such settlements should be
evaluated from an ex ante perspective. Shapiro’s proposed antitrust
standard is that “a patent settlement cannot lead to lower expected
consumer surplus than would have arisen from ongoing litigation,”42
where the expectations are determined at the time of settlement.
The claim that the actual validity of the patent is irrelevant hinges on
this assumption; the model compares the actual settlement to the
expected outcome in litigation, not to a court’s determination of the
outcome that would have occurred at trial.

assess patent strength directly if one is trying to determine whether a settlement
benefits consumers.”).
40. See In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 988 (2003) (“[T]he quid pro
quo for the payment was an agreement by the generic to defer entry beyond the date
that represents an otherwise reasonable litigation compromise.” (citing Shapiro,
supra note 8)), vacated, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005); Petition for Writ of Certiorari
for Plaintiff-Appellee, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 05-273, 2005 WL 2105243,
at *16 (U.S. Aug. 29, 2005) (adopting Shapiro’s conception of patents as
“probabilistic”); James J. O’Connell, Second Bites and the Search for a Standard: The
DOJ’s Cipro Brief, 24 A.B.A. ANTITRUST MAG., Spring 2010, at 7, 11 (describing how
the Justice Department adopted Shapiro’s theory of probabilistic patents when
Shapiro served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics in the Antitrust
Division of the DOJ).
41. See Shapiro, supra note 8, at 396.
42. Id. (emphasis added).
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Finally, Shapiro assumes that the terms of a settlement are not
affected by risk aversion.43 If the parties were risk averse, it becomes
more complex to infer the parties’ beliefs from the settlement terms.44
C. Antitrust Issues Raised by Patent Settlements
Part of the difficulty in analyzing potentially anticompetitive patent
settlements arises from the tension between antitrust and patent law.
Although the primary goal of antitrust law is to maximize consumer
surplus,45 antitrust doctrine recognizes an exception for patents.46
Thus, the owner of a valid patent may legally exclude competition
that infringes upon the patent47 and may also license its patent to
horizontal competitors in ways that would otherwise be considered
illegal horizontal restraints.48
In the context of settlements, the intersection of patent and
antitrust law is especially complex. Although any settlement between
competitors is technically a horizontal restraint, courts have long
interpreted the antitrust laws to permit competitors to settle patent
disputes on reasonable terms.49 However, courts have held such
settlements to be illegal when they include restraints beyond the
patent issues in dispute.50

43. See id. at 410.
44. Because this critique is orthogonal to the primary argument in this Article,
the remaining discussion assumes that the parties are risk neutral.
45. See John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust:
Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 213 n.85 (2008).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 300 (1948) (holding
that “the precise terms of the [patent] grant define the limits of a patentee’s
monopoly and the area in which the patentee is freed from competition”); Precision
Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945) (observing
that “a patent is an exception to the general rule against monopolies”). See generally
Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813
(1984) (discussing the boundary between patent and antitrust law).
47. Kaplow, supra note 46, at 1817.
48. See Line Material Co., 333 U.S. at 308 (“During its term, a valid patent excludes
all except its owner from the use of the protected process or product. This
monopoly may be enjoyed exclusively by the patentee or he may assign the patent ‘or
any interest therein’ to others.” (citations omitted)).
49. See Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931) (“Where
there are legitimately conflicting claims or threatened interferences, a settlement by
agreement, rather than litigation, is not precluded by the [Sherman] Act.”).
50. See Line Material Co., 333 U.S. at 308 (“It is . . . well settled that the possession
of a valid patent or patents does not give the patentee any exemption from the
provisions of the Sherman Act beyond the limits of the patent monopoly.”).

FISCHMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

THE CIRCULAR LOGIC OF ACTAVIS

10/31/2016 8:16 PM

105

The primary challenge in addressing reverse payments is
determining the standard for antitrust scrutiny when the validity of
the patent is in question. The Patent Act provides that a “patent shall
be presumed valid,” and the “burden of establishing invalidity” rests
with the party challenging the patent.51 Prior to Actavis, some circuits
treated this presumption as irrefutable in the antitrust context,
holding that settlements were legal as long as their terms were within
the “scope of the patent.”52 However, this “scope of the patent” test
permitted settlements that forbid entry for the entire term of the
patent, effectively gutting the Hatch-Waxman Act by delaying generic
market entry.53 For this reason, the majority in Actavis ultimately
rejected the “scope of the patent” test.54
As a general matter, courts have reviewed patent settlements on an
ex ante basis, assessing the reasonableness of the settlements at the
time they were negotiated. In doing so, some courts have argued that
ex post review would be unfair to litigants given the uncertainty of
patent litigation and the possibility of treble damages, and would
therefore discourage settlements.55 Other courts have relied on the
51. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012).
52. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1333
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that the district court correctly “recognized that any
adverse anti-competitive effects within the scope of the . . . patent could not be
redressed by antitrust law”), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013);
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 211 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he law
allows the settlement even of suits involving weak patents with the presumption that
the patent is valid and that settlement is merely an extension of the valid patent
monopoly.”), abrogated by Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223. The Eleventh Circuit held similarly
in the Actavis litigation. See FTC v. Watson Pharm., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir.
2012) (interpreting prior precedents to hold that “absent sham litigation or fraud in
obtaining the patent, a reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust attack
so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary
potential of the patent”), rev’d sub nom. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223.
53. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, at 365 (observing
that
the
application of the presumption of validity to patent settlements would allow a patent
holder and a generic competitor to “cartelize the market” for their products);
Michael A. Carrier, Why the “Scope of the Patent” Test Cannot Solve the Drug Patent
Settlement Problem, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2012) (arguing that the presumption
of validity is especially problematic in the Hatch-Waxman context).
54. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227.
55. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 203–05 (“We cannot judge this post-trial,
pre-appeal settlement on the basis of the likelihood vel non of [the patent-holder’s]
success had it not settled but rather pursued its appeal. As the Supreme Court noted
in another context, ‘[i]t is just not possible for a litigant to prove in advance that the
judicial system will lead to any particular result in his case.’” (quoting Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 159–60 (1990))); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344
F.3d 1294, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Patent litigation is too complex and the results
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general proposition in antitrust law that the legality of horizontal
agreements should be determined at the time they are made.56 An
agreement may be permissible under the antitrust laws if it
“promoted enterprise and productivity at the time it was adopted.”57
On the other hand, if an agreement was anticompetitive at the time it
was made, it is no defense that it ultimately failed to generate
anticompetitive effects.58 Indeed, it may not be possible to determine
whether the effects of an agreement are anticompetitive until after
litigation is concluded.59

too uncertain for parties to accurately forecast whether enforcing the exclusionary
right through settlement will expose them to treble damages if the patent immunity
were destroyed by the mere invalidity of the patent. This uncertainty, coupled with a
treble damages penalty, would tend to discourage settlement of any validity
challenges . . . .”).
56. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 204 (holding that “the relevant time” for
evaluating a settlement agreement is “when [the parties] were entering into the
Settlement Agreement”); Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1306; In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (voicing
concern that it “might chill patent settlements altogether” if the legality of such
settlements depended on a later court’s determination of the patent’s validity), aff’d,
544 F.3d 1323, abrogated by Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223.
57. Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1985).
58. See In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 656 (7th
Cir. 2002) (finding that “[a]n agreement to fix . . . prices is . . . a per se violation of
the Sherman Act” regardless of whether the agreement led to lower prices); AREEDA
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, at 219 (“As a general proposition, the per se rule
against naked horizontal market division agreements applies equally to firms that
were actual competitors before the division agreement took effect and to firms whose
competition was merely potential.”).
59. As an aside, it is not clear that this argument should apply to legal uncertainty
at the time the parties entered the agreement. No one has argued that antitrust law
regarding patent settlements should have been applied on an ex ante basis to the
defendants in Actavis. A determination that a patent is valid is also a legal
conclusion. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966)
(stating that “the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law”); ROBERT PATRICK
MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS
1003 (6th ed. 2013) (“Issues of patent validity are normally treated as questions of law
with subsidiary questions of fact.”). Whether the patent is infringed is ultimately a
question of fact but typically depends on legal determinations about the scope of the
patent. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996)
(holding that patent claim construction is a question of law but that whether a
particular use infringes the patent is a question of fact). Courts clearly have the
capacity to resolve such legal uncertainty, and litigants are presumed to know the law
as it applies to them.
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D. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Actavis
The Actavis case arose out of a settlement of litigation initiated
under the Hatch-Waxman Act involving AndroGel, a topical
testosterone gel.60 In 2003, two generic drug companies, Actavis61
and Paddock Laboratories, filed ANDAs under the Hatch-Waxman
Act to market generic versions of AndroGel, certifying under
Paragraph IV that the AndroGel patent was invalid, so their generic
versions would not infringe it.62 Solvay Pharmaceuticals, the owner of
the AndroGel patent, filed an infringement action against the two
generic companies under Paragraph IV.63 The companies litigated
the infringement action for three years.64
Following discovery, the generic firms moved for summary
judgment on the validity of the patent.65 Before the district judge
ruled on the motion, however, the firms reached a settlement in early
2006.66 Under the terms of the settlement, the generic firms agreed
not to market generic versions of AndroGel until August 2015, sixtyfive months before the expiration date of the patent.67 In exchange,
the patent holder made a large payment to the generic companies,
which was partly tied to future profits on AndroGel, with an expected
value between $200 million and $350 million.68 As part of the
agreement, the generic firms also agreed to promote branded
AndroGel to urologists and primary care doctors, and one of the
firms agreed to serve as a backup manufacturer for AndroGel.69
The FTC subsequently filed an antitrust action against the firms
involved in the AndroGel settlement.70 The district court granted the

60. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227–29.
61. At the time of the initial application, Actavis was known as Watson
Pharmaceuticals. Id. at 2229.
62. Id.
63. Id. A third generic company, Par Pharmaceutical, joined the litigation in
partnership with Paddock, agreeing to share the litigation costs as well as the
potential profits. Id.
64. Id.
65. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1304 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub
nom. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223.
66. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229.
67. Id.
68. See id. (listing the payments Solvay agreed to make: $12 million in total to
Paddock; $60 million in total to Par; and an estimated $19–$30 million annually, for
nine years, to Actavis).
69. Id.; Watson Pharm., 677 F.3d at 1305.
70. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229.
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firms’ motion to dismiss, which the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.71
Backing away from its earlier scrutiny of reverse payments,72 the
Eleventh Circuit held that any settlement within the scope of the
patent was legal.73
The panel emphasized the administrative
difficulties of applying a “retrospective predict-the-likely-outcomethat-never-came approach,” which “would . . . impose heavy burdens
on the parties and courts” and “undo much of the benefit of settling
patent litigation.”74
After a decade of conflicting decisions on reverse-payment
settlements in the various circuits,75 the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.76 The Court rejected the argument advanced by the
defendants that the presumption of patent validity immunizes their
settlement from antitrust scrutiny.77 By a 5–3 vote,78 the Court held
that a reverse payment can trigger antitrust scrutiny if the payment
exceeds a reasonable estimate of litigation costs and the fair value of
any services rendered.79 The Court further reasoned that it would
not typically be necessary for a court to address the merits of the
patent dispute; instead, the size of the reverse payment would serve as
a surrogate for the “patent’s weakness.”80 Finally, the Court ruled
that such settlements should be evaluated under the “rule-of-reason,”
but it provided relatively little guidance regarding how this analysis
would be structured.81
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion was vague about how the reverse
payment served as a surrogate.82 Although it is hardly apparent from

71. Watson Pharm., 677 F.3d at 1306, 1315.
72. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
73. Watson Pharm., 677 F.3d at 1312 (“[A] reverse payment settlement is immune
from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the
exclusionary potential of the patent.”).
74. Id. at 1314.
75. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
76. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013).
77. Id. at 2231–33.
78. Justice Alito recused himself because he had a financial interest in Actavis.
FIX THE COURT, BLIND TRUST: HOW SUPREME COURT JUSTICES ARE RULING IN FAVOR OF
THE PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES WHOSE SECURITIES THEY OWN 6 (May 28, 2015),
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/2015_0528_fixcourt.pdf.
79. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2226, 2236.
80. Id. at 2236–37.
81. See id. at 2238 (“We . . . leave to the lower courts the structuring of the
present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”).
82. The ambiguity in the Court’s use of the reverse payment as a surrogate was
compounded by its puzzling citation to a passage of the Areeda & Hovenkamp
antitrust treatise. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. This passage, however, addresses
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the language of the opinion, many commentators have interpreted
the Court’s holding as using the reverse payment as a surrogate for
an objective ex ante assessment that the patent would be upheld.83 In
referring to the reverse payment as a surrogate for the “patent’s
weakness”84 and stating that a reverse payment “likely seeks to prevent
the risk of competition,”85 the Court seemed to be referring to the ex
ante reasonableness of the settlement, not the ex post validity of the
patent. The reference to the “risk of competition” suggests that the
payment is not a surrogate for weakness of the patent in an absolute
sense, but rather the weakness of the patent relative to the profits the
firms would earn under the settlement. Thus, even if the patent had
a ninety percent chance of being upheld, a settlement would be
deemed anticompetitive if the parties extracted ninety-five percent of
the monopoly profits through the settlement. This interpretation
most closely tracks Shapiro’s model,86 and several prominent antitrust
scholars also have accepted this interpretation of Actavis.87
whether courts can infer market power from a large reverse payment. See AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, at 350–52. Some passages in the broader treatise section
cited by the Court suggest that the strength of the patent could be inferred from a
reverse payment. Some of these passages, however, appear to endorse an ex ante
standard for evaluating patent settlements. See id. at 323–24 (describing an antitrust
standard for evaluating settlements based on whether “the settlement is a reasonable
accommodation and is not more anticompetitive than a likely outcome of the litigation”
(second emphasis added)); id. at 352 (“The antitrust ‘reasonableness’ of agreements
is normally determined as of the time the agreement is made, given what the parties knew or
reasonably should have known at that time. As a result, reasonableness of a patent
settlement agreement cannot be made to depend on an ex post determination that
the patent was or was not valid or that the challenger’s product did or did not
constitute infringement.” (emphasis added)). Other passages, however, support
some degree of reliance on an ex post determination. See id. at 343 (stating that “a
large settlement payment is a strong signal that the patent in question is invalid”
(emphasis added)); id. at 347 (“Even with the presumption [of patent validity]
removed, . . . a court must still determine whether the patent was valid and
infringed . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. at 348 (“A full rule of reason query almost
certainly means an inquiry into patent validity, scope, and infringement.”).
83. See Aaron Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference: Theory and Practice, 67 RUTGERS U.
L. REV. 585, 618 (2015) (arguing that “[t]he Supreme Court adopted an ex ante
approach in Actavis, which held that settling by paying to avoid the risk of
competition, i.e., the risk of losing the patent case, is an antitrust violation”).
84. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236–37 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 2236 (emphasis added).
86. See id.
87. See Aaron Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, 28 A.B.A. ANTITRUST MAG., Fall 2013,
at 16–17 (arguing that a reverse payment implies patent weakness in a relative sense,
not in an absolute sense); Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and
the Supreme Court’s Actavis Decision, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 3, 5–6 (2014)
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Although the Court held that it was unnecessary to investigate the
strength of the patent, it stopped short of endorsing the position
taken by some courts88 and commentators89 that ex post validity should
never be relevant. Instead, it held that it “is normally not necessary to
litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust question.”90 However, it
did not explain when a court should consider the merits of a patent
or what kind of examination would be appropriate.
An alternative reading of the Court’s opinion is that it was using
the reverse payment as a surrogate for the patent holder’s subjective
beliefs about the outcome of litigation, rather than as an objective ex
ante assessment:
An unexplained large reverse payment itself would normally
suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about the patent’s survival.
And that fact, in turn, suggests that the payment’s objective is to
maintain supracompetitive prices to be shared among the patentee
and the challenger rather than face what might have been a
competitive market—the very anticompetitive consequence that
underlies the claim of antitrust unlawfulness.91

In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts would have applied
the presumption of patent validity, thus permitting any settlements
whose terms are within the scope of the patent.92
He also
emphatically rejected the ex ante approach to evaluating patent
settlements. He argued that “a patent is either valid or invalid”93 and
that hard legal questions have correct answers, even if they have not
yet been resolved by courts.94 Although Chief Justice Roberts did not
develop these arguments further, his opinion hinted at
jurisprudential issues that were not addressed by the majority. These
issues will be explored in Part II.

(describing the Actavis standard as holding that “[a] large settlement exclusion
payment disproportionate to litigation risk can be unlawful under antitrust’s rule of
reason, without inquiry into whether the patent is actually invalid or not infringed”
(emphasis added)).
88. See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Edlin et al., supra note 83, at 617 (arguing that ex post conclusions
regarding validity are irrelevant).
90. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 2236 (emphasis added).
92. See id. at 2239 (stating that the patent holder violates antitrust law only when
it excludes competition beyond the scope of the patent).
93. Id. at 2244 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
94. See id. (“Just because people don’t know the answer [to a hard legal question]
doesn’t mean there is no answer until a court declares one.”).
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II. ACTAVIS CONFLATES PREDICTION AND JUSTIFICATION
The Court reasoned in Actavis that the strength of a patent can be
inferred from settlement terms without any inquiry into the merits.95
This Part criticizes the Actavis inference on jurisprudential grounds.
The Court’s inference relies critically on the prediction theory of law;
it equates legal propositions with litigants’ predictions about what
courts will do. Although scholars debate what the Court actually held
in Actavis, any plausible interpretation of the Court’s holding relies
on the prediction theory.
The Court did not consciously endorse the prediction theory;96
rather, the Court’s reliance on prediction was likely a result of
interdisciplinary misunderstanding. The early economic literature
on reverse payments explicitly conflated law with court decisions,97
although it did not manifest any awareness that this was controversial.
Without addressing the underlying assumptions, government lawyers
repeated the conclusions from this economic literature in briefs and
orders challenging patent settlements.98 The Court ultimately
adopted the same reasoning in Actavis, but without acknowledging its
controversial foundations.99
A. The Prediction Theory of Law
The prediction theory of law originated in Oliver Wendell
Holmes’s The Path of the Law speech in 1897.100 In Holmes’s famous
formulation, “[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and

95. See id. at 2237 (majority opinion).
96. See infra notes 105–07 and accompanying text.
97. See Keith Leffler & Cristofer Leffler, The Probabilistic Nature of Patent Rights: In
Response to Kevin McDonald, 17 A.B.A. ANTITRUST MAG., Summer 2003, at 77, 78
(disputing that “there is something akin to ‘the patent’s objective validity’—
regardless of what a federal court may say”); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Analysis of Patent
Settlement Between Rivals, 17 A.B.A. ANTITRUST MAG., Summer 2003, at 70, 76
(contending that “there is no workable notion of validity distinct from the
determination of the court” and claiming that there are no meaningful distinctions
between “whether the patent is valid or invalid” and “whether the patentee wins or
loses the litigation”).
98. See supra note 40.
99. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234–37 (detailing the Court’s five sets of considerations
that influenced its reasoning).
100. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 991 (1997).
This Article cites to Holmes’s speech as republished in the Harvard Law Review 100
years after its delivery and first publication; for the original issue in which the
published speech appears, see 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
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nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”101 Although
Holmes’s broad language could be interpreted as articulating a
theory of law, the context of his statement demonstrates that he was
describing the law from the perspective of a “bad man.”102 To
Holmes’s bad man, law is devoid of normativity; he does not look to
law to supply “reasons for [his] conduct.”103 The bad man values
knowledge about the law, but only insofar as it aids him in predicting
the consequences of his actions and thereby avoiding punishment.104
Holmes’s prediction theory may provide a useful perspective to
litigants who are negotiating a settlement or to economists modeling the
behavior of such litigants. However, as H.L.A. Hart famously pointed
out in The Concept of Law, Holmes’s conception of law cannot possibly
provide guidance to judges deciding cases.105 If judges view rules as
predictions, then “a judge who sets out to discover the ‘law’ . . . is really
just trying to discover what she will do.”106 When litigants seek to predict
judicial decisions, they must recognize that “the courts regard legal rules
not as predictions, but as standards to be followed in decision.”107
In criticizing the prediction theory, Hart drew a key distinction
between the external and internal points of view.108 The internal

101. Holmes, supra note 100, at 994. Holmes’s prediction theory was popularized
by legal realists who echoed Holmes’s language in similarly stark terms. See JEROME
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 51 (1949) (describing law as “specific past
decisions, and guesses as to actual specific future decisions”); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE
BRAMBLE BUSH: THE CLASSIC LECTURES ON THE LAW AND LAW SCHOOL 5 (2d ed. 2008)
(“What these officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself.”); Felix S.
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809,
840 (1935) (“Washed in cynical acid, every legal problem can . . . be interpreted as a
question concerning the positive behavior of judges.”).
102. See Holmes, supra note 100, at 992.
103. Id. at 993.
104. Id.
105. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 146–47 (3d ed. 2012) (arguing that the
“contention that rules are the predictions of courts’ decisions . . . cannot apply to the
courts’ own statements of a legal rule”).
106. BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 17–18 (2007); see also David Luban,
The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer: A Centennial Essay on Holmes’s The Path of the Law,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1577–78 (1997) [hereinafter Luban, The Bad Man] (stating
that judges will not answer questions about a case by predicting their own behavior,
especially if the only basis for the answer is their behavior).
107. HART, supra note 105, at 147.
108. Id. at 89–91. For helpful expositions on the internal and external points of
view, see generally Charles L. Barzun, Inside-out: Beyond the Internal/External
Distinction in Legal Scholarship, 101 VA. L. REV. 1203 (2015), and Scott J. Shapiro, What
Is the Internal Point of View?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1157 (2006).
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point of view is that of someone who accepts rules as guides to her
conduct. The external perspective is that of the Holmesian bad man,
who does not perceive rules as imposing an obligation on himself.
Hart criticized the prediction theory for eliminating the internal
point of view altogether.109 From this perspective, it is impossible to
criticize a court for being wrong; whatever decision a court reaches
must be correct by virtue of the court having made it.110
It is fair to say that the prediction theory, as characterized by Hart,
is not taken seriously as a theory of law.111 Some contemporary
commentators argue that Holmes and the realists never intended it
to be a theory of law and that the theory as described by Hart was a
mere caricature.112 Even Holmes emphasized that the means of
109. HART, supra note 105, at 91.
110. See id. at 141–47 (discussing the failure of the prediction theory to account
for judicial error); Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1915, 1927 (2005) (observing that “the prediction theory cannot make
sense of some judicial errors”); Luban, The Bad Man, supra note 106, at 1577–78
(1997) (“The problem is not that [judges] can’t get the prediction right, but rather
that they can’t get it wrong: any answer they come up with is the right answer, just
because they have come up with it.”).
111. See Leslie Green, The Concept of Law Revisited, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1687, 1694
(1996) (describing as “decisive” Hart’s arguments against “behaviorist accounts
influential among legal realists, which conceived of rules as predictions of official
action”); Luban, The Bad Man, supra note 106, at 1577 (arguing that the
characterization of law as “prophecies of what the courts will do in fact . . . makes a
certain amount of sense from an advocate’s point of view, but it makes no sense at all
from the point of view of a judge”); Frederick Schauer, Prediction and Particularity, 78
B.U. L. REV. 773, 773 n.2 (1998) (“[I]t is nonsense to suppose that law to the
judge . . . is a prediction of what that judge would decide.”). Even many of the legal
realists ultimately recanted their endorsements of the prediction theory. See
LLEWELLYN, supra note 101, at xxviii–xxx (recanting his prior characterization of law
and denying that it ever accurately described his views); Felix S. Cohen, The Problems
of a Functional Jurisprudence, 1 MOD. L. REV. 5, 17 (1937) (“When a judge [asks a legal
question], in the course of writing his opinion, he is not attempting to predict his
own behaviour.”).
112. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 36 (1986) (asserting that the “best
version” of the prediction theory defines the lawyer’s role as predicting a judge’s
decision and the judge’s role as predicting “the general course or ‘path’ the law is
most likely to take”); LEITER, supra note 106, at 18 (arguing that “Hart misread the
Realists as answering philosophical questions of conceptual analysis”); Luban, The
Bad Man, supra note 106, at 1578–80 (describing how common critiques of the
prediction theory mischaracterize Holmes’s views); William Twining, Other People’s
Power: The Bad Man and English Positivism, 1897–1997, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 189, 199
(1997) (asserting that “Hart indulged in decontextualized readings of the flimsiest of
texts” in criticizing Holmes and the realists); Robin West, Three Positivisms, 78 B.U. L.
REV. 791, 808 (1998) (contending that the standard objection to the prediction
theory “fails for the straightforward reason that it rests on a false, or at least a
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prediction were traditional legal materials: “a body of reports, of
treatises, and of statutes.”113 However, the Court in Actavis implicitly
relied upon Hart’s caricatured version of the prediction theory rather
than Holmes’s “traditional legal materials.”
Arguments about valid legal justification may seem abstract, but
every court must justify its exercise of power with reasons that are
derived from valid legal sources.114 These reasons are publicized so
that the litigants and the public can scrutinize them and appellate
courts can evaluate the grounds of the original decision. Legal
reasons also limit courts’ future decision making and provide
constraints against judicial arbitrariness.115 Finally, these reasons
provide guidance to future litigants, which is especially important in
areas of law where settlement is pervasive. If judges do not articulate
their reasoning in cases that go to trial, the law will fail to cast a
shadow in which parties can settle.116
Furthermore, a court’s legitimacy necessarily depends on its ability
to justify its holdings with valid reasons. Imagine, for example, if the
Supreme Court had relied on prediction markets to decide National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.117 Given the complex legal

question-begging, premise—to wit, that the work of the judge is to declare the law, to
decide what the law is,” whereas advocates of the prediction theory viewed judges as
being “in the business of making the law”).
113. Holmes, supra note 100, at 991.
114. See Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142
U. PA. L. REV. 549, 587–89 (1993) (“In order to be justified, coercion must, at least,
enforce outcomes warranted by the set of legal reasons.”); Owen M. Fiss, Foreword:
The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (1979) (discussing the requirement that
judges justify their decisions); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92
HARV. L. REV. 353, 364–67 (1978) (stating that “the distinguishing characteristic of
adjudication lies in the fact that it confers on the affected party” the opportunity to
“present[] proofs and reasoned arguments,” and that “this participation is frustrated,
and the whole proceeding becomes a farce, should the decision that emerges make
no pretense whatever to rationality”); Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L.
REV. 987, 1001–05 (2008) (discussing the rationales for legal justification).
115. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 651 (1995) (“If a
decisionmaker is prima facie committed in the future to the reasons she gives for a
conclusion now, and if those reasons are typically more general than the conclusion
they support, then she commits herself to deciding some number of cases whose full
factual detail she cannot possibly now comprehend.”).
116. See Coleman & Silver, supra note 2, at 114 (noting that the precedential value of
judge-made law benefits third parties as well as the litigants); Luban, Settlements, supra
note 5, at 2626 (“[L]egal rules and precedents are valuable not only as a source of
certainty, but also as a reasoned elaboration and visible expression of public values.”).
117. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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issues presented,118 the Court could have saved time and effort by
relying on the Intrade prediction market, which indicated a seventyfive percent chance that the Affordable Care Act would be
invalidated.119 The Court could have written: “We use the Intrade
prediction market as a surrogate for the constitutionality of the
Affordable Care Act. The market predicts that we will strike down
the Act. Therefore, we declare the Act to be unconstitutional.”
An opinion based on the prediction markets, of course, would have
been universally condemned because it would have failed to provide
a valid legal justification. The prediction market was forecasting
whether a majority of justices would vote to invalidate the Act. Any
legitimate decision needed to explain whether the Court should
invalidate the Act.120
In this fanciful example, the Court’s reliance on prediction markets
to resolve a question of law is plainly absurd. The inference that the
Court endorsed in Actavis is equally circular, but it is less apparent
because it is embedded within an economic model. The following
section examines the logical foundations of the Actavis inference.
B. How Actavis Relies on the Prediction Theory
The Court’s reliance on the prediction theory in Actavis is partly
the product of an interdisciplinary misunderstanding. Economists
have examined the welfare implications of patent settlements,
approaching patent law from an external point of view. The
conclusions from this literature were then offered as guidance to
courts. The Supreme Court ultimately adopted these same
conclusions in Actavis, without showing any awareness of their
Holmesian foundations.

118. The Court devoted six hours of oral argument to issues involving the AntiInjunction Act, the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, the
Congressional taxing power, the Spending Clause, and severability. Lawrence T.
Gresser & Elizabeth F. Bernhardt, Lessons Learned from Affordable Care Act Oral
Arguments, N.Y. L.J. at *1 n.17 (Aug. 27, 2012), https://www.cohengresser.com/assets
/publications/50.pdf.
119. See David Leonhardt, When the Crowd Isn’t Wise, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/08/sunday-review/when-the-crowd-isnt-wise.html.
120. There was likely substantial divergence between those who believed that the
Court would invalidate the Act and those who believed that the Court should have
invalidated the Act. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The
Obvious Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 1 (2011)
(predicting that the Court might strike down the Affordable Care Act and that doing
so would be a “flagrant abuse of its power”).
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These Holmesian foundations are most apparent in Shapiro’s
original article on patent settlements, which modeled settlement
from the external point of view of the litigants rather than the
internal perspective of a judge.121 This is most evident in his
discussion of “patent strength,” a key parameter in the model.122
Shapiro avoided using a traditional legal understanding of patent
strength by characterizing “patent validity and patent breadth” as
“technical issues” that are “outside the scope of [the] economic
analysis.”123 Instead, Shapiro defined “patent strength” purely by
reference to predictions about court decisions: it represents “[t]he
probability that the patentholder ‘wins.’”124
Relying on this
definition, Shapiro concluded that a reverse payment provides “a
clear signal that the settlement is likely to be anticompetitive.”125
Shapiro underscored this external perspective by characterizing a
patent as a “probabilistic property right,”126 akin to a lottery ticket
whose value is determined by the likelihood that a court will uphold
it.127 Shapiro’s conception entailed a redefinition of patents: a
patent is not the right to prevent others from engaging in infringing
activities, but rather “the right to sue to prevent others from infringing
the patent.”128 In his economic model, there is no particularized
inquiry into the actual validity of the patent—the patent is merely a
lottery ticket with a stochastic payoff.
This conception of patents as probabilistic may seem natural given
the highly unpredictable nature of patent litigation.129 For an actor
who only wants to predict what a court will decide, a patent may
121. Shapiro, supra note 8, at 407–08.
122. See id. at 399.
123. Id. at 397.
124. Id. at 399.
125. Id. at 407.
126. Id. at 395. Shapiro drew upon an established body of literature in treating
patents as probabilistic. See generally F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in
EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3, 3 (Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001) (analogizing patents to lottery tickets); Ian Ayres & Paul
Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The
Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 994
(1999) (proposing a regime of probabilistic patents); Mark A. Lemley & Carl
Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 76 (2005) (exploring “the
economics of probabilistic patents”).
127. See Shapiro, supra note 8, at 395 (calibrating the “patentholder’s rights
according to the likelihood that the patentholder would win the patent litigation”).
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 126, at 75 (“When a patent holder asserts its
patent against an alleged infringer, the patent holder is rolling the dice.”).
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indeed appear indistinguishable from a lottery ticket.130 If Holmes’s
bad man were the CEO of a pharmaceutical company, he would not
be interested in a doctrinal argument about the validity of a patent;
he would want to know the likelihood that a court would uphold it.
Shapiro’s conception of patents as probabilistic may be useful for
modeling the behavior of actors who view the legal system from an
external perspective such as firms considering litigation or negotiating
a settlement. The theory of probabilistic patents is problematic,
however, when it is used to provide guidance to a court, which must
approach patent law from the internal point of view and provide legal
justification for its decisions. For a judge to equate a patent with a
lottery ticket is to say that its validity is random; a decision upholding
or invalidating the patent could not be justified by legal reasons.131 If
this were so, then it would be appropriate for the judge to decide each
patent infringement case by spinning a roulette wheel.132 Needless to
say, this is not how infringement cases are actually resolved, and such
an approach would be rightfully condemned.133
Similarly, Shapiro’s claim that a patent merely “gives the
patentholder . . . the right to sue to prevent others from infringing the
patent”134 may be useful from an external point of view, but it is pure
nonsense from an internal point of view. How would a judge resolve
an infringement case under such a standard? If a patent merely grants
the patentee the right to sue, has the right already been vindicated
once the lawsuit is filed? The problem with this standard, of course, is
that it does not provide the court any guidance in deciding an
infringement case once a patentee has exercised its right to sue.
The same problem arises with Shapiro’s definition of “patent
strength” as “[t]he probability that the patentholder wins.”135 A judge

130. See Scherer, supra note 126, at 16 (analogizing patents to lottery tickets).
131. See NEIL DUXBURY, RANDOM JUSTICE: ON LOTTERIES AND LEGAL DECISIONMAKING 13–14 (1999) (describing decision by lottery as antithetical to reasoned
decision making).
132. See Jody S. Kraus, Legal Determinacy and Moral Justification, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1773, 1780 (2007) (arguing that a random decision procedure is the only
appropriate option when there is a “lack of affirmative reasons that justify a
particular action” by the state).
133. See Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 840–41 (1984) (describing how
the use of a coin flip in criminal sentencing “offended this society’s commitment to
rationality”); Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1, 5 (2009) (observing that “[j]udges strongly condemn randomization for their own
merits decisions”).
134. See Shapiro, supra note 8, at 395 (emphasis added).
135. See id. at 399.
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determining the strength of a patent cannot simply ask, “What is the
probability that I will rule for the patentholder?” Instead, the judge
must still consider relevant legal sources and give valid reasons that
can be reviewed by an appellate court.136 This is most clearly true
when courts are called upon to approve settlements in other
contexts, such as class actions; if the probabilities of various outcomes
were simply inferred from the terms of the parties’ settlement, a
court would never have any basis to reject a settlement.
Although Shapiro did not initially propose that courts should apply
his model to determine whether settlements are anticompetitive, it
did not take long for others to do so. Several influential antitrust
scholars cited Shapiro’s conclusions in claiming that reverse-payment
settlements are generally anticompetitive137 and proposing that courts
attach a presumption of illegality to such settlements.138
The FTC also cited Shapiro’s model in arguing that a reverse
payment constitutes a “quid pro quo for . . . an agreement by the
generic to defer entry beyond the date that represents an otherwise
reasonable litigation compromise,”139 and should therefore support

136. See Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v.
Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 434 (1968) (holding that a trial court approving a
settlement must provide “an adequate . . . consideration of the merits of the claims,
the difficulties of pursuing them, the potential harm . . . caused by delay, and the
fairness of the terms of settlement,” and that “a reviewing court [must] have some
basis for distinguishing between well-reasoned conclusions arrived at after a
comprehensive consideration of all relevant factors, and mere boilerplate approval
phrased in appropriate language but unsupported by evaluation of the facts or
analysis of the law”).
137. See Hemphill, supra note 8, at 1572–73, 1573 n.81 (“Economic modeling has
shown formally that settlements that include a cash payment from the patentee to
the infringer provide consumers with less welfare, on average, than seeing the
litigation to completion.” (citing Shapiro, supra note 8, at 407–08)); Hovenkamp et
al., supra note 8, at 1757–58, 1758 n.169 (contending that “a large exclusion
payment . . . suggests some inherent uncertainty as to the validity or scope of the
patent,” which “suggests that exclusion payments are anticompetitive” (citing
Shapiro, supra note 8, at 393)).
138. See Hemphill, supra note 8, at 1596 (proposing a rule in which “[a] settlement
that contains a cash payment [from the patentee to the generic] or permits the
retention of exclusivity eligibility” establishes a “presumption of illegality”);
Hovenkamp et al., supra note 8, at 1759 (proposing a rule that “a payment from a
patentee to an infringement defendant for the latter’s exit from the market is
presumptively unlawful”).
139. See In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 988 (2003) (“[T]he quid pro
quo for the payment was an agreement by the generic to defer entry beyond the date
that represents an otherwise reasonable litigation compromise.” (citing Shapiro,
supra note 8, at 1757–61)), vacated, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005).
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an inference of illegality. The FTC further contended that a court
need not consider the merits of an underlying patent claim.140 The
phrase “otherwise reasonable litigation compromise” obscured the
Holmesian underpinnings of the new test; according to the FTC’s
position, the parties’ entitlements were determined by their
likelihood of success in court, not the strength of the patent as
determined by the merits. The FTC further endorsed Shapiro’s
theory of probabilistic patents, echoing the view that “a patent is not
a right to exclude, but rather a right to try to exclude.”141
Subsequently, DOJ’s antitrust division also endorsed the theory of
probabilistic patents in cases involving pharmaceutical settlements.142
Nearly ten years after it first adopted Shapiro’s proposed standard,
the FTC advanced the same argument before the Supreme Court in
Actavis.143 It argued that a settlement with a reverse payment should
be presumptively illegal because “the most natural inference is that
the payment has purchased an additional increment of market
exclusivity.”144 On the other hand, it contended that a settlement
without a reverse payment should be presumptively legal because
“the agreed-upon [entry] date roughly corresponds to the parties’
assessments of their likelihood of success in the litigation.”145 In
other words, the FTC’s position was that a party’s entitlement in
settlement is determined by the relief it predicts a court would grant
it in litigation.
Unlike some of the economic literature on settlements, the
majority opinion in Actavis did not explicitly endorse the prediction
theory. Although it inferred that a reverse payment is “a workable
surrogate for a patent’s weakness,”146 the Court at least acknowledged
a conceptual distinction between patent law and the litigants’
predictions. In the end, however, the result was the same: the Court
determined the firms’ entitlements by their predictions about the
outcome of litigation rather than by reference to patent law.

140. Id. at 992–99.
141. Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Plaintiff-Appellee, FTC v. Schering-Plough
Corp., No. 05-273, 2005 WL 2105243, at *16 nn.9–10 (U.S. Aug. 29, 2005) (quoting
Hovenkamp et al., supra note 8, at 1761) (citing Shapiro, supra note 8, at 395).
142. O’Connell, supra note 40, at 11.
143. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229–30 (2013).
144. See Brief for Petitioner at 36, FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223
(2013) (No. 12–416).
145. Id. at 28.
146. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236–37.
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C. Alternative Rationales for the Actavis Inference
The economic literature on patent settlements explicitly conflates
law with the actions of courts and overlooks the distinction between
the internal and external points of view.147 In Actavis, the Court
appeared to accept these conclusions without examining their
underlying assumptions. Nevertheless, it is possible that the Court’s
holding could be justified by alternative rationales. This Section
considers some alternative explanations of Actavis and shows that they
still implicitly rely on the prediction theory.
1. A reverse payment represents the patentee’s subjective beliefs about validity
One alternative rationale maintains that a reverse payment
represents a patent holder’s subjective beliefs about the weakness of
the patent rather than an objective measure of the patent’s weakness.
Indeed, the Court in Actavis explained that a reverse payment may
“suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about the patent’s
survival,” which may be probative of the patentee’s objective in
offering the payment.148
This interpretation escapes the crudest form of the prediction
theory by using reverse payments to infer the patentee’s subjective
beliefs rather than an objective determination about the strength of
the patent.
Nevertheless, this interpretation has four serious
problems. First, it is a questionable reading of the Court’s opinion in
Actavis. The Court stated that using a reverse payment as “a workable
surrogate for a patent’s weakness” would avoid “conduct[ing] a
detailed exploration of the validity of the patent itself.”149 This
reasoning suggests that the payment serves as a surrogate for the
objective strength, not merely the parties’ subjective beliefs.
Second, a reverse payment only indicates the patentee’s beliefs
about what a court will do, not its beliefs about whether the patent is
actually valid and infringed. For example, a criminal defendant may
believe that a jury is likely to convict her, but that does not imply that
she believes that she is guilty.150 Similarly, a patentee may have faith
147. See supra notes 121–38 and accompanying text.
148. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236; see also Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 8, at 299–
301 (proposing a standard for the legality of reverse payments that depends on “the
patent holder’s own probability estimate” regarding the outcome of litigation).
149. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236–37.
150. Indeed, it is widely known that many innocent defendants plead guilty.
BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO
WRONG 152 (2011); see John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated:
Factually Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 167 (2014)
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that the patent is valid but less confidence that a court will actually
uphold it. Thus, a reverse payment does not support an inference
that the patent is weak unless one equates beliefs about the outcome
of patent litigation with beliefs about the validity of a patent. Thus,
the inference still relies on the prediction theory.
Third, the settlement terms demonstrate that a patent holder
retains some doubts about whether the patent would be upheld.
These terms, however, do not support an inference that the generic
firm has similar doubts. Shapiro’s model adopted, as a simplifying
assumption, that the parties agreed on the probability that the
settlement would be upheld.151 As a general matter, however, parties
will have divergent beliefs about the outcome of litigation.152 Any
settlement will reveal an upper bound on the patentee’s beliefs about
the probability that the patent will be upheld, but it will also reveal a
lower bound on the generic firm’s beliefs.153
For example, suppose that the firms agreed to a settlement that
allowed generic entry halfway through the patent term but with no
reverse payment. The patent holder would accept such a settlement
if it believed there was no more than a fifty percent chance that its
patent would survive; the generic firm would similarly believe that the
patent had no less than a fifty percent chance. Thus, the generic firm
may well believe that the patent is likely to be upheld. If the
settlement included a reverse payment, then it is possible that the
generic firm would believe that the settlement benefits or harms
consumers. Because the settlement only reveals a lower bound on
the generic firm’s beliefs about the patent, the settlement terms only
yield ambiguous inferences about the generic firm’s subjective intent.
Fourth, even if the patent holder believes that consumers are worse
off in the settlement than in litigation, this fact does not provide a
basis for distinguishing settlements with reverse payments from
traditional settlements. Whenever the patent holder accepts a
settlement, it believes that it can earn at least as much from the
exclusivity provided by the settlement than it would in litigation.

(asserting that innocent defendants will plead guilty to accept a lenient plea bargain
rather than risk a wrongful conviction and a longer sentence at trial).
151. See supra Section I.B (discussing Shapiro’s model).
152. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9 (1984) (observing that opposing litigants may have differing
estimates of a legal standard that will determine the outcome of litigation).
153. An upper bound on the generic firm’s beliefs could be inferred from the fact
that it filed an ANDA in the first place. The generic firm would be unlikely to
challenge the patent if it believed it was one hundred percent likely to be upheld.
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Thus, it must believe that consumers will be no better off under the
settlement. Although the reverse payment may further reduce
consumer surplus, it does not distinguish pro-competitive settlements
from anticompetitive ones, at least on the basis of the patentee’s
subjective beliefs.
2.

A reverse payment constitutes payment to the generic firm to delay entry
In Actavis, the Court observed that a reverse payment may “provide
strong evidence that the patentee seeks to induce the generic
challenger to abandon its claim”154 and that such a payment “likely
seeks to prevent the risk of competition.”155 Some courts and
commentators have emphasized this language in characterizing the
Court’s holding.156 Thus, a second interpretation of Actavis could be
that it merely prohibits “paying for delay”157 or payments that
“prevent the risk of competition.”
This interpretation, however, cannot explain how the Court
distinguished anticompetitive settlements from permissible ones. As
Chief Justice Roberts observed in dissent, any settlement—even one
without a reverse payment—eliminates some possibility that the patent
will be invalidated.158 Any settlement that permits generic entry before
the expiration of the patent, moreover, still involves compensation to
the generic firm; the generic firm will not abandon its claim unless it is
offered something in return.159 Yet the FTC contended that traditional
settlements should be presumptively legal,160 and the Court did not
purport to subject such settlements to antitrust liability.161

154. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235.
155. Id. at 2236.
156. See, e.g., In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 3d 224, 240 (D. Conn.
2015) (“The anticompetitive harm, under Actavis, is that the reverse-payment
settlement ‘seeks to prevent the risk of competition.’”); Aaron Edlin et al., supra note
87, at 16 (“Reverse payments can violate the antitrust laws and they do so when they
are payments to delay competition, or otherwise to limit the risk of competition.”).
157. See Hemphill, supra note 8.
158. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2245 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (observing that the
majority’s logic “cannot possibly be limited to reverse-payment agreements, or those
that are ‘large,’” and that any settlement “takes away some chance that the generic
would have litigated until the patent was invalidated”).
159. See Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D.
Ill. 2003) (observing that “any settlement agreement can be characterized as
involving ‘compensation’ to the [infringement] defendant, who would not settle
unless he had something to show for the settlement”).
160. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
161. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237 (majority opinion) (stating that traditional
settlements without reverse payments do not present antitrust concerns).
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Thus, antitrust liability cannot rest conclusively on the fact that a
settlement offers compensation to the generic firm and eliminates some
risk of competition. Under Actavis, the problem with reverse-payment
settlements must be that they cause excessive delay in generic entry or
unduly eliminate the risk of competition relative to some baseline for
permissible settlements. If settlements without reverse payments are
permissible, and if reverse-payment settlements are anticompetitive,
then the baseline is implicitly determined by the economic model;
settlements are illegal if the firms derive profits in excess of what they
predicted a court would provide in litigation. Thus, this interpretation
of Actavis still relies on the prediction theory.
3.

The settlement terms are merely evidence of patent weakness
As discussed above, some of the economic literature on patent
settlements committed an ontological error, conflating law with
predictions about what courts will do.162 Although the Court adopted
the conclusions from this literature,163 it does not follow that the
Court necessarily committed the same errors. Perhaps the Court was
merely holding that the settlement terms have epistemic value for
determining the strength of the patent. In a well-functioning legal
system, judicial decisions are presumably correlated with correct legal
answers, and experienced lawyers are reasonably competent at
predicting what courts will do. Thus, a court could view the terms of
a settlement as useful information that could inform its analysis of the
strength of a patent.
Such reasoning, however, cannot explain why a court should treat
the settlement terms as decisive. If the standard for legality depends
solely on the parties’ expectations at the time of the settlement, as
some commentators argue,164 then the actual merits would be
irrelevant and courts would be justified in excluding arguments about
the merits of the patent. However, if the standard for legality is based
on an objective determination of the strength of the patent and the
settlement terms are merely evidence of that strength, then there is
no reason for courts to exclude arguments about the merits of the
patent. Thus, the Supreme Court’s observation that “it is normally
162. See supra Section II.B.
163. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234–37.
164. See Edlin et al., supra note 83, at 617 (arguing that “the correct antitrust
analysis must be based on what was reasonably known to the parties about patent
validity and infringement at the time they entered into their settlement,” and that
subsequent findings regarding patent validity and infringement do not determine
whether there was an antitrust violation).
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not necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust
question”165 is inconsistent with the view that the settlement terms are
merely evidence of the patent strength. Similarly, the refusal of some
lower courts to consider arguments about patent validity166—even in
circumstances where the validity had already been litigated in other
lawsuits167—is starkly at odds with the view that courts are using the
settlement terms solely for their epistemic value.
Of course, a determination about actual validity and infringement
would not necessarily be dispositive regarding the ex ante
reasonableness of the settlement, although it would certainly be
informative.168 However, the parties’ predictions about the outcome
of litigation are also highly imperfect proxies for the merits.
Although litigants’ predictions about court rulings are likely
correlated with correct decisions, the precise correlation is
unknowable. Thus, if the settlement terms are merely informative of
the strength of the patent, it is difficult to justify excluding arguments
that directly address the merits.
D. Legitimate Forms of Prediction in Legal Reasoning
When discussed in its most radical form, the prediction theory
clearly cannot supply adequate justifications for judicial decisions. As
Hart demonstrated, “prophecies of what the courts will do in fact,”169
by themselves, cannot supply adequate justifications for judicial
decisions.170 However, in certain narrow contexts, courts have
legitimately relied upon predictions of court decisions. For example,
when deciding whether to grant preliminary injunctions, courts
predict the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits.171 Similarly,

165. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
166. See In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 3d 224, 240 (D. Conn. 2015)
(clarifying that antitrust plaintiffs “need not plead (or prove) the weakness of the . . .
patent, because the patent’s ultimate validity is not at issue”); In re Cipro Cases I & II,
348 P.3d 845, 870 (Cal. 2015) (noting that evidence of patent validity “will not
automatically demonstrate [that] an agreement was procompetitive”).
167. See Edlin et al., supra note 83, at 617 (discussing cases where the patent
validity had been litigated after the settlement but before the antitrust action).
168. If the antitrust standard depends on the merits of the patent claim, then any
reasons that would justify a holding of validity and infringement ex post would
presumably support a holding that the settlement was reasonable ex ante.
169. See Holmes, supra note 100, at 994.
170. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text.
171. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (asserting that
a plaintiff must establish a likelihood of success on the merits when seeking a
preliminary injunction).
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when a single justice of the Supreme Court considers whether to
grant a stay of a lower court’s decision, the justice must predict the
likelihood that the entire Court would reverse the lower court.172
Moreover, in diversity cases, federal courts applying state law predict
how the highest court in the state would resolve any uncertain legal
issues.173 Judicial approval is also required for the settlement of
certain types of cases—such as class actions, shareholder derivative
suits, cases arising from bankruptcy proceedings, and antitrust
consent decrees in cases initiated by the United States174—which
generally require some assessment of the plaintiffs’ likelihood of
success.175 Finally, lower courts also have occasionally discounted
precedents based on predictions that higher courts will overrule
them, although this practice is controversial,176 and the Supreme
Court has disapproved of it.177

172. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (1980) (stating that for a single
justice to stay a lower court opinion, the applicant “must . . . establish[] that there is a
‘reasonable probability’ that four Justices will consider the issue sufficiently meritorious to
grant certiorari or to note probable jurisdiction” and “that there is a fair prospect that a
majority of the Court will conclude that the decision below was erroneous”).
173. Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and
Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1461 (1997). See generally Michael
C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 695–715 (1995) (describing
how federal courts predict how state high courts would resolve issues of state law and
the justifications for this practice); Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the
Presumption of Forum Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1237, 1247–51 (2011) (describing a federal
court’s obligations when applying state substantive law in diversity cases).
174. See Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Private Mass Tort Settlements, 42 SETON
HALL L. REV. 123, 130–31 (2012) (identifying “well-known examples of settlements”
that require judicial approval, including shareholder settlements, bankruptcy claims,
and consent decrees in civil antitrust suits, as well as “less prominent examples,” such
as environmental consent decrees, employment claim settlements, and settlements
involving minors).
175. See Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981) (“Courts judge
the fairness of a proposed compromise by weighing the plaintiff’s likelihood of
success on the merits against the amount and form of the relief offered in the
settlement.”); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that
approval of a class action settlement is partially dependent on a comparison of “the
terms of the compromise with the likely rewards of litigation” (quoting Protective
Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414,
424–25 (1968))).
176. Compare C. Steven Bradford, Following Dead Precedent: The Supreme Court’s IllAdvised Rejection of Anticipatory Overruling, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 39–42 (1990)
(outlining the concept of “anticipatory overruling” and concluding that it “makes the
law more responsive to change”), and Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The
Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1–8, 16–22
(1994) (developing and defending a “proxy model” of predictive decision making in
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As these examples show, predictions about how courts will decide
future cases are sometimes viewed as compatible with traditional legal
reasoning, although the contours of this exception are not crisply
delineated. Nevertheless, these exceptions have several common
features that distinguish them from the inference in Actavis. First,
legitimate forms of prediction involve one adjudicator predicting the
decisions of another: the first typically has the authority to decide the
case at hand, while the second has ultimate authority to resolve a
particular legal issue that is relevant to the dispute. Second, the court
must still justify the prediction in a written opinion using legitimate
legal reasons. Third, the predictions do not have precedential force
outside the context of the dispute. Finally, the prediction only occurs
in circumstances where it is impossible or infeasible for the
adjudicator with ultimate authority to address the issue.
1.

Authority
In legitimate uses of legal prediction, the agent engaging in
prediction has formal authority to resolve the dispute at hand. The
agent is either predicting how it would resolve the issue itself if time
permitted full consideration, or it is predicting the action of an agent
that possesses superior authority to resolve the particular issue.178
Moreover, both the predicting and the predicted agents must be
unbiased adjudicators and may not have a pecuniary interest in the
outcome.179 For instance, a trial judge has authority to grant a
preliminary injunction in circumstances where the judge does not
have adequate time to fully examine the merits. Similarly, a single
justice has authority to grant a stay of a lower court’s decision, but the
justice does not speak for the entire Court.180 A judge approving a
settlement is authorized by statutory or procedural rules to compare
the settlement terms with a prediction of the likely outcome of
litigation, but the approving judge cannot conclusively determine the
lower courts), with Dorf, supra note 173, at 679–89 (criticizing the prediction approach
because it undermines “the rule of law” and the ideal of “impersonal justice”).
177. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (“The Court of Appeals was
correct in applying [stare decisis] despite disagreement with [prior precedent], for it
is this Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.”); Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (criticizing the court
of appeals for predicting that the Supreme Court would overturn prior precedent).
178. See Caminker, supra note 176, at 7.
179. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973) (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510, 523 (1927)).
180. 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f) (2012); Barnes v. E-Systems, Inc. Grp. Hosp. Med. &
Surgical Ins. Plan, 501 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1991).
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merits.181 Lastly, federal courts have jurisdiction to hear diversity cases,
but they may not authoritatively interpret state law.182 By contrast, in
patent settlements, the litigants themselves clearly do not possess the
authority to determine the validity of the patent at issue. Indeed,
delegating authority to the litigants would violate due process because
they have a direct and substantial economic stake in the outcome.183
2.

Articulated reasons
When one court or judge predicts the actions of a court with
higher authority, the prediction is based on legitimate legal reasons,
which are articulated in an opinion. When one court acts as a proxy
for another, it still employs traditional methods of legal reasoning,
although from the imagined perspective of the other court. A judge
issuing a stay or a preliminary injunction need not provide a fullfledged opinion but must still articulate reasons for granting or
denying the injunction. Similarly, a judge approving a class action
settlement must hold a hearing and find that the settlement is “fair,
reasonable, and adequate.”184
A federal judge predicting the
evolution of state law would discuss the reasons given in recent state
court opinions and how they bear on the case at hand. The federal
judge would not merely predict how the state court would rule, but
also explain why the state court would rule that way. The federal
judge need not personally agree with the reasons she believes the
state court would give, but she must view these reasons as legitimate
and articulate them in a written opinion.
Occasionally, and more controversially, federal courts have
examined the views expressed by individual judges to predict whether
a particular view would command a majority in a multimember
court.185 In such instances, however, federal courts still restrict their

181. See Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that
“settlement terms should be compared with the likely rewards the class would have
received following a successful trial of the case”).
182. See Green, supra note 173, at 1249–50 (observing that in diversity cases, a
federal court may be called upon to “decide [an] unsettled issue” of state law, even
though “it lacks the lawmaking power to do so”).
183. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
184. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
185. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 949 F.2d 99, 102 (3d Cir.
1991) (observing the views of individual justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
and concluding that under Pennsylvania law, “a majority . . . have expressed their
belief, albeit in dictum, that the benefits afforded to innocent third-parties under the
Financial Responsibility law may not be rescinded”); Barnette v. W. Va. State Bd. of
Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 252–53 (S.D. W. Va. 1942) (declining to treat Minersville School
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consideration to legitimate legal reasons expressed by individual
judges.186 It would be illegitimate, for example, for a federal court to
predict how a state supreme court would rule by examining the
political affiliations of the justices or the contributors to their election
campaigns. An all-Republican state supreme court may well be a
valid predictor of its sympathy toward big business, but that court
could not justify an opinion by stating, “We are Republicans,
therefore we rule in favor of big business.” Similarly, a federal court
in a diversity case could not use the same rationale to justify a
prediction about state law that favors big business, irrespective of its
predictive validity. Thus, any court predicting the decisions of
another court must not merely explain its prediction, but must
provide valid legal justification for its holding.
By contrast, when parties settle a dispute, they do not give reasons
for the assessments underlying their bargain.187 Thus, a court using a
settlement as a surrogate for patent validity is not justifying its
decision based on reasons derived from patent law. Moreover, the
parties’ bargain will typically reflect all the reasons they anticipate a
court would rely upon in assessing the patent, not merely the
legitimate reasons. In reaching a settlement, the parties will
presumably consider the unreliability of juries and the competence,
ideological predilections, and perceived bias of the district judge.188
Indeed, in patent settlements with millions of dollars at stake, it
would be folly to ignore such factors in negotiating a settlement.
When a subsequent court uses the settlement as a surrogate for a
District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), as binding on federal circuit courts because four
of the seven Justices who participated in Gobitis had “given public expression to the view
that [the decision was] unsound”), aff’d, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Dorf, supra note 173, at
702–03 (criticizing the head-counting approach to prediction).
186. See State Farm, 949 F.2d at 103–04 (outlining previous opinions of various
Pennsylvania Supreme Court justices to support the court’s legal predictions).
187. See Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 2, at 1085 (describing how judges
“explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the
Constitution and statutes,” a “duty [that] is not discharged when the parties settle”);
Luban, Settlements, supra note 5, at 2639 (observing that settlements typically provide
“little more than a bare announcement of how much money changed hands” and
“no reasons or reasoning”).
188. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 208
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[N]o matter how valid a patent is . . . it is still a gamble to place a
technology case in the hands of a lay judge or jury.”), aff’d, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2008), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); Dru Stevenson &
Nicholas J. Wagoner, Bargaining in the Shadow of Big Data, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1337, 1364–
72 (2015) (describing how litigants use databases that provide information about
judges’ decisional tendencies when settling patent disputes).
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legal judgment, however, it cannot isolate the legitimate
considerations from the illegitimate ones. The court cannot know if
the settlement was based on the parties’ best assessment of the law or
their negative assessments of the competence of judges and juries.
3.

Force of law
The permissible forms of prediction have a third feature in
common: they can be used to resolve particular claims, but they carry
limited force of law. When a judge determines whether to grant a
preliminary injunction or a temporary stay, the judge’s opinion is not
considered a final judgment on the merits.189 Similarly, judicial
approval of a settlement may be precedential as to the standards for
approval but not to the underlying merits. Federal court predictions
of state law are binding on the parties in the dispute, but such
predictions do not have precedential effect in state courts.190 In
Actavis, by contrast, the litigants’ predictions, as embodied in their
settlement of the infringement case, have binding force in the
subsequent antitrust action.191
4.

Necessity of prediction
Finally, prediction is permitted when procedural rules or practical
considerations preclude the authoritative court from resolving the
legal issue in the first instance. The very nature of preliminary
injunctions and temporary stays limits their application to situations
where a plaintiff “is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief.”192 Similarly, approval of a settlement must
necessarily take place prior to a determination of the merits. Federal
courts interpreting state law in diversity cases are sometimes able to
certify questions of state law to the state supreme court, but the state

189. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1982). The
holding can be precedential as to the standards for granting preliminary injunctions
or temporary stays. A preliminary injunction similarly does not count as a victory on
the merits for determining whether fee-shifting statutes apply. See Sole v. Wyner, 551
U.S. 74, 77–78 (2007) (holding that prevailing on a motion for a preliminary
injunction is not sufficient for an award of attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1988 (2012)).
190. See Clark, supra note 173, at 1508–13 (discussing how a federal court
prediction of state law can be binding as to the litigants even if it lacks precedential
force in state courts).
191. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230.
192. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see Rostker v.
Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (1980) (requiring “a demonstration that irreparable
harm is likely to result from the denial of a stay” as a precondition for granting a stay).
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courts are not obligated to resolve every such question.193 By
contrast, the argument for permitting lower courts to predict the
decisions of higher courts is somewhat weaker. Although it may be
unlikely that the higher court itself will resolve the issue on appeal,
the higher court possesses the power to do so.
In Actavis, the Court was concerned about the substantial burdens
of litigating a patent dispute as part of an antitrust action.194
However, there is no doubt that a court adjudicating an antitrust
challenge to a patent settlement has the capacity to decide all
relevant patent issues. In contrast to a court approving a settlement
or considering a preliminary injunction, there are also no time
constraints that would preclude the court from resolving these issues.
5.

Conclusion
The type of prediction that the Court relied on in Actavis differs
starkly from other accepted forms of legal prediction. The litigants
lacked formal authority to interpret the law, and they did not
articulate legal reasons in predicting the outcome of their litigation.
Nonetheless, their settlement carried legal force in a subsequent
antitrust case. Finally, although addressing the merits of the patent
would have been burdensome, it was not impossible to do so.
The Court provided only a cursory discussion of the rationale
underlying its use of the settlement terms as a surrogate for the
patent.195 It did not acknowledge that it was relying on the litigants’
predictions of the merits, nor did it carefully consider the reasons
justifying this holding. Indeed, the Court’s broad expansion of the
use of legal prediction in Actavis may well have been unintentional.
Now that the Court has validated this practice, however, litigants will
likely argue that courts should draw similar inferences in other
contexts or from other types of economic assets.196 Given how sharply
Actavis deviates from prior understandings regarding the use of legal
193. See Green, supra note 173, at 1250 n.65. In fact, a few states do not permit
certification at all. See Deborah J. Challener, Distinguishing Certification from Abstention
in Diversity Cases: Postponement Versus Abdication of the Duty to Exercise Jurisdiction, 38
RUTGERS L.J. 847, 866 n.133 (2007) (stating that Arkansas and North Carolina do not
permit certification as a statutory matter, while the Missouri Supreme Court refuses
to answer certified questions on state constitutional grounds).
194. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234 (noting the Eleventh Circuit’s “fear that antitrust
scrutiny of a reverse payment agreement would require the parties to litigate the
validity of the patent,” which would be “time consuming, complex, and expensive”).
195. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237–38.
196. For examples where courts and scholars have considered such arguments, see
infra Section IV.B.
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prediction in judicial decisions, it will be important for lower courts
to provide principled limits to the use of such inferences.
III. ACTAVIS IGNORES FEEDBACK EFFECTS BETWEEN THE COURT AND
THE LITIGANTS
Although the terms of a patent settlement cannot provide a
legitimate justification for a subsequent holding on the validity or
infringement of the patent, courts may potentially draw inferences
from settlements in making purely factual or discretionary
determinations.
The terms of such settlements may also be
informative to actors outside the court system, who need not be
concerned with legal justification. For example, if a settlement
signals a lack of confidence in the patent, the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) could initiate an administrative review of the patent’s
validity.197 The FTC may also exploit such signals to determine which
firms to investigate. Similarly, other generic competitors may draw
inferences about the weakness of a patent from the terms of such a
settlement, which may inform their decisions about whether to
challenge the patent.
Firms negotiating a settlement should therefore consider the
inferences that competitors and regulators may draw about the
patent from the terms of their settlement and how these inferences
will affect the behavior of these third parties. Similarly, agents
drawing inferences from settlements must properly account for the
fact that the settling firms may adjust their settlement strategy as a
result of these inferences. Thus, there is an interdependence
between the settlement terms and subsequent inferences made by
courts, regulators, and rivals.
In an analogous context, finance scholars have used the term
“feedback effects” to describe the two-way influences between asset
prices and decision making by firms and regulators.198 Stock prices,

197. See Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 281, 322–23 (2011) (proposing that the Patent and Trademark Office treat reversepayment settlements as a signal that would trigger the administrative review process).
198. See Philip Bond et al., The Real Effects of Financial Markets, 4 ANN. REV. FIN.
ECON. 339, 343 (2012) (“[T]he extent to which prices reveal information about an
underlying state variable depends critically on how decision makers will use this
information. When using information in the price, decision makers might harm the
informativeness of the price with respect to the variable they wish to learn.”); Philip
Bond & Itay Goldstein, Government Intervention and Information Aggregation by Prices, 70
J. FIN. 2777, 2780 (2015) (stating that government policies affect “[t]he information
in security prices” and that “it is thus important to consider the consequences this
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for example, convey information about a firm’s prospects to the
firm’s managers, competitors, investors, and other market
participants. These agents may exploit this information when making
decisions, which may in turn affect stock prices. For example, a
regulator considering a bailout of a struggling bank may draw
inferences about the firm’s financial condition from its stock price,
but the stock price will also reflect the market’s expectation about the
likelihood of a bailout. Thus, in deriving inferences about the firm’s
financial condition from the stock price, the regulator should
account for how the market’s expectation about the regulator’s
action influences the stock price.199
Similar reasoning applies to inferences from settlements. The
Court in Actavis implicitly relied on an economic model that assumed
the litigants were settling in the shadow of an expected court
judgment.200 However, this model did not account for the fact that a
court could draw an inference from the settlement. From the
external perspective of a policy-maker, such models demonstrated
the potential for collusive settlements and offered strong arguments
for regulating patent settlements. Nevertheless, the model did not
incorporate the feedback effects that arose once courts were
permitted to draw inferences from settlement terms. If courts are
drawing such inferences, parties are no longer settling in the shadow
of the law; they are settling in the shadow of the inference a court will
draw from their settlement. By drawing this inference from the
settlement terms, the Court negated the validity of the economic
model upon which it relied.
Thus, the Actavis inference is valid only if one assumes that the
parties are naïve about the inference that a court will derive from the
terms of their settlement. They must be oblivious to the possibility
that a subsequent court will infer their beliefs from the settlement
terms and hence they must not internalize the effects of this
inference. The Court’s holding in Actavis thus rests on a peculiar set
of assumptions about the parties’ sophistication: they are evidently
sophisticated enough to generate a reliable prediction about the
outcome of the patent litigation, yet they are completely naïve about
the potential for antitrust liability.

has for price informativeness”); Emre Ozdenoren & Kathy Yuan, Feedback Effects and
Asset Prices, 63 J. FIN. 1939, 1939 (2008) (modeling how “asset prices [are]
determined if price affects fundamental value, which in turn affects price”).
199. See Bond & Goldstein, supra note 198, at 2780.
200. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
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These assumptions would be absurd for any settlement that took
place after Actavis. Litigants that settled prior to Actavis, however,
would not have perfectly anticipated the Court’s ruling.
Nevertheless, as long as antitrust liability was a plausible concern,
rational litigants would have considered the possibility that a court
would draw an inference from their settlement terms and adjusted
their behavior accordingly. Indeed, there is evidence that litigants
considered antitrust consequences in structuring settlements. If
litigants were confident that reverse-payment settlements were
immune from antitrust scrutiny, they could have maximized their
profits by structuring settlements that precluded generic entry for the
entire term of the relevant patent.201 Yet most reverse-payment
settlements did not exclude competition for the full terms of the
relevant patents.
Empirical evidence also shows that litigants
considered the potential of antitrust liability. For example, reversepayment settlements disappeared in 2000 when the FTC announced
it would challenge them, reappeared in 2005 when the Second and
Eleventh Circuits deemed them to be legal,202 and then declined
substantially again after Actavis.203
Feedback effects also complicate inferences by non-judicial actors
such as regulators or competitors. As long as the settling parties are
aware of the signaling value of their settlement, they will internalize
the effects their settlement has on regulators and competitors. For
example, a settlement that reveals doubt about the patent’s validity
might provoke a generic manufacturer to challenge the patent or the
PTO to review it. Because such effects will influence the patent
holder’s incentives in settling, the settlement will not directly reflect
the patent holder’s beliefs about the outcome of litigation. Such
beliefs can only be inferred from a sophisticated signaling model.
This flaw in the Actavis inference can be remedied by modeling the
interaction between the settling parties and the court as a signaling
game. Indeed, a robust body of literature in law and economics
discusses how courts may draw valid inferences from signaling

201. See Murat C. Mungan, Reverse Payments, Perverse Incentives, 27 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 34–36 (2013) (showing that the parties would exclude entry for the entire
patent life if reverse payments were per se legal).
202. See Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 8, at 75.
203. See FTC, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE
MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003, at 3
(2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/agreements-filled-fed
eral-trade-commission-under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement/160113mmaf
y14rpt.pdf.
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behavior by litigants or other courts.204 Finance scholars have
developed sophisticated models of feedback effects in financial
markets, demonstrating how firms and regulators can draw valid
inferences from asset prices, which simultaneously internalize
predictions about the firms’ and regulators’ actions.205
To illustrate how valid inferences could be drawn from settlements,
suppose that a patent holder settles a lawsuit on terms that signal a
lack of confidence that the patent will be upheld. If a court,
regulator, or competitor could observe the terms of the settlement, it
could infer the patent holder’s lack of confidence, which would in
turn inform its decisions.
A competitor, for example, could
challenge the patent or market an infringing product; a regulator
could review the patent. A rational patent holder would recognize
the signaling effects of the settlement and would take them into
account when bargaining over the settlement terms. Similarly, the
rational competitor would understand that the patent holder was
aware of the signaling effects of the settlement. In the terminology of
game theory, the dynamic between the parties could be modeled as a
signaling game,206 and the parties would choose strategies that result
in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.207 The litigants and the court
would be drawing rational inferences from the others’ behavior, and
each would choose an optimal course of conduct given their beliefs.
204. See Ronen Avraham & Abraham Wickelgren, Third-Party Litigation Funding—A
Signaling Model, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 233, 247–54 (2014) (constructing a model in
which a Bayesian judge draws inferences from litigation financing terms); Andrew F.
Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Appealing Judgments, 31 RAND J. ECON. 502, 502–
03 (2000) (developing a model in which an appellate court can draw inferences from
a litigant’s decision whether to appeal); Chris William Sanchirico, The Burden of Proof
in Civil Litigation: A Simple Model of Mechanism Design, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 431,
432 (1997) (constructing a model of Bayesian adjudication that justifies traditional
burdens of proof); Matt Spitzer & Eric Talley, Judicial Auditing, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 649,
649–51 (2000) (developing a model of judicial hierarchy in which a Bayesian higher
court decides whether to audit lower court decisions).
205. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
206. In two-player signaling games, one player has superior information about a
particular parameter and chooses an action that may convey information about this
parameter to the uninformed player. See DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME
THEORY 324–26 (1991) (defining signaling games). In this context, there are three
players: the patent holder, the generic firm, and the court. The first two players
have private information about the strength of the patent, which is potentially
revealed to the court through the settlement terms.
207. Id. at 175–80 (defining perfect Bayesian equilibrium). A perfect Bayesian
equilibrium can be understood informally as “a set of strategies and beliefs such that,
at any stage of the game, strategies are optimal given the beliefs, and the beliefs are
obtained from equilibrium strategies and observed actions.” Id. at 326.
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However, the economic analysis upon which Actavis relies cannot
be premised on any such model of rational behavior. The inference
in Actavis depends on the notion that the magnitude of a reverse
payment conveys information to the court about the strength of the
patent. In game theory parlance, there must be a separating
equilibrium.208 The litigants’ actions—the terms on which they settle
the infringement action—must vary according to their beliefs about
the strength of the patent.
Such a separating equilibrium may well have existed with the
litigants in Actavis. The possibility of antitrust liability was evidently
not sufficient to deter the reverse payment at the time of their
settlement, although antitrust concerns may have reduced the
magnitude of the payment.209 This would be true for other litigants
who settled their infringement claims prior to Actavis.
Yet the same reasoning does not support applying the inference
going forward. If the rule in Actavis provides sufficient deterrence
against reverse payments, then the separating equilibrium disappears.
If the litigants are aware that a reverse-payment settlement will trigger
antitrust liability, then they will anticipate that their agreement could
be deemed unenforceable, the patent could lose much of its value, and
parties could face financial penalties and a class action lawsuit seeking
treble damages. Litigants who believe that a patent is likely to be
upheld would not want to incur such costs, but neither would litigants
who were less confident. If the penalties for reverse payments were
severe enough, then all patent litigants would choose to avoid them.
In the terminology of signaling games, there would be a pooling
equilibrium:210 all patent litigants would choose the same signal—that
is, no reverse payment. As such, the absence of a reverse payment
would not convey any information about the litigants’ beliefs.
If game theory predicts that all rational patent owners would
eschew reverse payments, then it is difficult to draw inferences about
litigants’ beliefs if they agree to a settlement that includes a reverse

208. In a signaling game, a separating equilibrium is one in which the informed
player chooses a strategy that fully reveals its private information. Id. at 327–28.
209. If the parties reduced the size of the reverse payment due to antitrust
concerns, then the size of the reverse payment would understate the parties’ actual
pessimism about the outcome of litigation and hence underestimate damages.
Nevertheless, the inference would be valid with regard to the conclusion that the
profits from settlement exceed the expected profits from litigation.
210. In a signaling game, a pooling equilibrium is one in which the informed
player always chooses the same strategy, so that the informed player does not reveal
any of its private information. FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 206, at 327.
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payment. In game theory parlance, a reverse payment would be “off
the equilibrium path,” because rational actors would never follow
that course.211 Perhaps the litigants are not fully rational, which
would invalidate all of the economic analysis upon which Actavis
relies. The model might also omit other considerations, such as
whether a court can precisely value the terms of a complex
settlement.212 A more sophisticated signaling model, one that
incorporates error in valuing the settlement terms, might potentially
support a valid inference about the parties’ beliefs from a reversepayment settlement. In Actavis, however, the Court did not rely on any
such sophisticated model. Even if the inference in Actavis was valid as
applied to the litigants in that case, as long as the Court’s holding
provides adequate deterrence against reverse payments, then the
Court’s reasoning cannot justify the same inference in future cases.
More sophisticated signaling models could support valid inferences
from settlement terms, but such models would require a sophisticated
understanding of game theory. This game theoretic approach would
also require a court to determine a prior probability of validity, which
would represent the court’s belief about the validity of the patent
before it even observes the settlement terms. Conceivably, the court
could reach its own independent assessment of the patent strength on
the basis of conventional legal materials, and then update this
assessment using the settlement terms. However, this approach would
negate the primary advantage of Actavis—avoiding an inquiry into the
merits. Alternatively, a prior probability could be stipulated based on
the presumption of patent validity; however, this presumption does
not apply to infringement. A third alternative would be to derive a
prior probability from a broader reference class of patents; however,
the choice of reference class will be inherently contestable.213
Given these complexities, it is questionable whether such an
approach would be more feasible for courts than simply investigating
the merits of the patent. A game theoretic approach to inference
might be more practical for regulatory agencies, which possess
greater technical sophistication. Agencies, for example, could
211. ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 178 (1992).
212. See Thomas McGuire et al., Resolving Reverse-Payment Settlements with the Smoking
Gun of Stock Price Movements, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1581, 1585–86 (2016) (describing the
difficulties that courts encounter in estimating the value of reverse payments).
213. See Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical
Models of Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 109–10 (2007) (discussing how the prior
probability in a Bayesian model of legal inference depends critically on the choice of
reference class).
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exploit signals generated from patent settlements to determine which
patents to review and which settlements to challenge as
anticompetitive. However, deriving valid inferences from settlements
involves serious conceptual challenges that were overlooked in the
Court’s opinion as well as in the academic commentary on Actavis.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
A. Implications for Antitrust Cases Involving Reverse Payments
Much of the confusion in the academic literature and case law on
reverse-payment settlements stems from a failure to distinguish law, as
viewed from an internal perspective, with predictions about court
judgments, as made by external observers. As a matter of economic
reality, the legal standard announced in Actavis was based on the
litigants’ predictions about court judgments. Nevertheless, the
majority’s opinion itself did not acknowledge that it was departing
from the internal point of view in analyzing the patent issues in the
case. As a result, the antitrust standard for patent settlements may
sometimes depend on what parties predict courts will do but at other
times on the legal merits. The Court’s failure to acknowledge this
distinction created deep confusion about when an internal or
external perspective should apply.
Unsurprisingly, district courts have struggled to apply Actavis.214
Some courts have interpreted Actavis broadly, condemning reverse
payments and refusing to consider alternative explanations for
them.215
Other courts, however, have interpreted its holding
narrowly. For example, some courts have applied Actavis only to
reverse payments involving cash, but not to other forms of

214. See In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 3d 224, 235 (D. Conn. 2015)
(“Several district courts have already applied Actavis, with not entirely consistent
results.”); Michael A. Carrier, How Not to Apply Actavis, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE
113, 113–14 (2015), http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewconte
nt.cgi?article=1005&context=nulr_online (criticizing district courts for failing to
follow Actavis faithfully); Davis & McEwan, supra note 21, at 567–70, 573–74
(discussing various ways lower courts have misinterpreted Actavis).
215. See, e.g., In re Aggrenox, 94 F. Supp. 3d at 241–46 (using Actavis’s rule of reason
analysis in determining that the plaintiffs alleged sufficient plausible facts to survive a
motion to dismiss); In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 750–51 (E.D.
Pa. 2014) (criticizing a narrow reading of Actavis); United Food & Commercial
Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1065–66,
1069–73 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that the court does not have to analyze the
validity of the patent to determine that the allegations are adequate under the rule
of reason).
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consideration.216 At least one federal district court has questioned
whether courts can avoid addressing the strength of the patent in the
antitrust analysis.217 These courts may be motivated in part by
skepticism about the Court’s reasoning.218
In some cases, such as settlements involving reverse payments in
cash or other readily valued assets, a court can simply apply the rule
of Actavis without confronting its underlying rationale. Many
settlements, however, involve transactions that are substantially more
complicated.219 For example, patent settlements may be coupled with
licensing agreements, joint marketing agreements, agreements by the
generic firm to serve as a backup producer of the branded drug, or
“no authorized generic” provisions in which the branded firm agrees
not to market its own generic version of the drug during the
exclusivity period.220 Indeed, settling firms may intentionally choose
arrangements that are difficult to value in order to obscure the
magnitude of a reverse payment.
In such cases, courts will be forced to grapple with some of the
unanswered questions raised by Actavis. For example, the court may
need to address whether Actavis actually rests on a Holmesian
conception of patent law or whether the size of the reverse payment
merely serves as a proxy for the weakness of the patent.221 If the latter,
then courts will have to clarify when antitrust defendants may present
arguments regarding the merits of the patents and how such arguments
should be weighed against the inferences drawn from the settlement.

216. See In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180, 192 (D.R.I. 2014)
(holding that Actavis only applies to reverse payments in the form of cash), vacated by
814 F.3d 538 (1st Cir. 2016); In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 18 F.
Supp. 3d 560, 570 (D.N.J. 2014) (same), vacated, 791 F.3d 388 (3d Cir. 2015); see also
In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-5479 (PGS)(LHG), 2014 WL 4988410, at
*19–23 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014) (dismissing a lawsuit because plaintiffs failed to provide
a reliable foundation for valuing a non-cash reverse payment).
217. See FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 3d 527, 531 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (doubting
whether the FTC’s position reflected the most reliable interpretation of Actavis when
it argued that “a patent’s strength or weakness is irrelevant to the antitrust analysis of
a reverse payment settlement” and “there is simply no room for a defense based on
the strength of the patent”).
218. Cf. Davis & McEwan, supra note 21, at 560–61, 561 n.18 (attributing lower
courts’ defiance of Actavis to their discomfort with “the internal logic . . . of federal
antitrust law” and their “ingrained disposition in favor of settlement”).
219. William O. Kerr & Cleve B. Tyler, Measuring Reverse Payments in the Wake of
Actavis, 28 A.B.A. ANTITRUST MAG., Fall 2013, at 30 (2013).
220. Id.
221. See supra Section II.C.3.
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If defendants are allowed to present arguments on the merits, then
courts will have to determine what sort of inquiry is appropriate. The
legality of settlements could be assessed by reference to an ex ante
test, comparing the terms of the settlement with an estimate of the
probability that the patent would be found valid, as determined at the
time of the settlement.222 Alternatively, courts could determine the
validity of the relevant patents on an ex post basis, as Chief Justice
Roberts advocated in his Actavis dissent.223 Although they are distinct
tests, they are clearly interrelated. If a court determines a patent to
be valid ex post, the reasons supporting that conclusion would likely
also support a holding that any settlement within the scope of that
patent was ex ante reasonable.224
If courts acknowledge that a reverse payment is merely a proxy for
patent strength, then courts must address whether defendants should
be allowed to present arguments that the terms of their settlement
provide a poor proxy. For example, litigants in patent cases often
consult databases that provide detailed information about the judges’
tendencies to grant or deny particular types of motions.225
Accordingly, antitrust defendants could argue that they settled in the
shadow of a particularly patent-hostile judge, so their patent
infringement case was stronger than the settlement terms indicated.
Defendants also could argue that they settled following a motion that
was wrongly decided, so their perceived chances of winning did not
correspond to the merits.
At least two scenarios may force judges to address some of the
difficult questions underlying Actavis. First, some patent settlements
also involve the settlement of counterclaims or parallel litigation
involving the same firms.226 To determine whether such a settlement
was anticompetitive under Actavis, a court would need to determine
whether the other claims were settled for fair value, if the patentee
222. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
223. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2244 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s arguments “are unresponsive to the basic
problem that settling a patent claim cannot possibly impose unlawful anticompetitive
harm if the patent holder is acting within the scope of a valid patent and therefore
permitted to do precisely what the antitrust suit claims is unlawful”).
224. See supra note 168.
225. See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 188, at 1364–72 (describing how parties
negotiating a patent settlement use databases such as Lex Machina that provide
information about judges’ decisional tendencies).
226. See, e.g., In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 523, 533 (D.N.J. 2014)
(describing a pharmaceutical patent settlement in which firms simultaneously settled
parallel litigation).
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overpaid, or if the generic firm underpaid to settle these claims.
Thus, a court would need to assess the likelihood of each party
prevailing in the other claim. If the parties simultaneously settled two
infringement cases, the legality of each settlement would then
require an inquiry into the merits of the patent at issue in the other
case. Given the complexity that this inquiry might entail, it might
make more sense for a court to simply evaluate the merits of the
patent at issue in each case.
Second, some settlement provisions may have asymmetric effects
on the parties, so that the loss to the patent holder is smaller than the
gain to the generic firm. Whenever the parties have potential gains
from trade—through licensing, backup manufacturing, or codevelopment agreements—they can structure the transaction so that
both parties are better off relative to a settlement based only on the
entry date. For instance, a patent holder could supply another drug
to the generic at a price that is above its own cost but below the price
that the generic could otherwise negotiate.227 Such a deal could
generate positive surplus to both parties.
To illustrate further, suppose that a patent has ten years remaining
in its term, and the parties agree that there is a fifty percent chance
that it will be upheld, so that entry after five years would yield the
same expected surplus as litigation. Also suppose that a licensing deal
generates positive surplus and distributes it so that both the patent
holder and the generic firm are strictly better off. The patent holder
might be willing to allow entry after four years, and the generic might
be willing to settle for entry after six years. Now, only some of the
mutually acceptable settlement outcomes would harm consumers,
relative to the expected outcome of litigation. In this scenario, a
court would have to assess the strength of the patent directly in order
to determine whether the settlement was anticompetitive. Thus, the
court would have to confront whether the assessment of the patent is
based on its legal merits or its economic value.
To be sure, even a limited inquiry into the merits of the patent
would be burdensome for the government, the pharmaceutical
companies, and the courts.228 However, courts are capable of
conducting patent “mini-trials” when appropriate.229 Courts regularly
litigate patent issues within antitrust cases that involve allegations of

227. See FTC v. AbbVie, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 3d 428, 436 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (describing
a settlement that included such an agreement).
228. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234 (majority opinion).
229. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013).
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sham litigation230 or allegations that a patent was procured by
Courts also regularly conduct “mini-trials” in legal
fraud.231
malpractice cases involving patent issues such as when a patent is
invalidated due to a lawyer’s alleged incompetence.232
Of course, if the government and the defendants both believed
that litigating a patent would be too burdensome, they would be free
to settle the antitrust case on terms that are mutually acceptable. If a
large reverse payment accurately predicted that a patent was unlikely
to be upheld, the government would have significant leverage over
the patent holder in negotiating a settlement. Admittedly, the
government would have been in a weaker bargaining position than if
it did not have to litigate the patent at all. Even under those
circumstances, however, the threat of an antitrust action may still be
sufficient to deter most collusive settlements involving weak
pharmaceutical patents.
Whether courts will succeed in developing coherent case law to
address collusive patent settlements remains unclear; a legislative or
regulatory solution may still be necessary.233 Agencies do not face the
same limitations as courts in drawing inferences from settlement
terms, and they potentially possess the sophistication to do so. In
addition, Actavis may have left some anticompetitive settlements
untouched. For example, the patent holder could agree to license
the challenger as a distributor of an authorized generic version of the
drug. Such a license could be struck at terms that allow the firms to
share monopoly profits, yet such a settlement would likely be legal
230. See Ian Simmons et al., The Continuing Relevance of Patent Validity in ReversePayment Litigation, 2014 CONCURRENCES, No. 2, at 25, 28. In such cases, courts may
conduct bifurcated proceedings, in which the patent issues are litigated prior to the
antitrust issues. See id. at 28 & nn.108–09 (citing examples of cases involving
bifurcated proceedings).
231. See id. at 25. These claims are more commonly known as “Walker Process claims.”
See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
232. See Minton, 133 S. Ct. at 1065 (discussing how a plaintiff in a legal malpractice
case would need to demonstrate, through a mini-trial, that his patent would have
been upheld but for his attorney’s error).
233. See Dolin, supra note 197; Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Daniel A. Crane, Patent
Punting: How FDA and Antitrust Courts Undermine the Hatch-Waxman Act to Avoid
Dealing with Patents, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 197, 203–04 (2015)
(advocating a greater role for the FDA in addressing patent validity and infringement
in reviewing patent settlements); C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust:
Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629,
670–82 (2009) (describing the FTC’s comparative institutional advantage over courts
in regulating patent settlements due to greater expertise and superior ability to
collect and analyze information).
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under Actavis.234 A policy restricting collusive settlements will likely
be most effective if settling firms have a clear understanding of the
standards for legality. Given the confusions underlying the rationale
in Actavis, a regulatory solution may be more effective than case-bycase adjudication in providing such clarity.235
B. Implications for Inferring the Merits from Other Economic Indicators
The concerns that this Article raises about Actavis may also apply to
other contexts in which courts draw inferences about substantive law
from economic indicators that reflect agents’ predictions about
judicial decisions. One district court applying Actavis, for example,
looked beyond the terms of the settlement to draw inferences from
other economic indicators.236 The court observed that the generic
firm launched its drug “at risk”—before the patent litigation had
been resolved—so that it would be liable for damages if the patent
was valid and infringed.237 Because the at-risk launch suggested that
the generic firm was confident it would prevail in litigation, the court
inferred that the patent was weak.238 The court further reasoned that
this inference was bolstered by a large drop in the patent holder’s
share price when the at-risk launch was announced,239 suggesting that
investors also believed that the generic firm would prevail in
litigation. Recently, some antitrust scholars have argued that courts
should follow a similar approach, inferring the legality of patent
settlements from changes in stock prices after settlements are
announced.240 Scholars have also advocated allowing courts to draw

234. See Eisenberg & Crane, supra note 233, at 240–41 (describing such a licensing
arrangement as an “anticompetitive work-around[]” to Actavis); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
FTC v. Actavis: The Patent-Antitrust Intersection Revisited, 93 N.C. L. REV. 375, 428–30
(2015) (interpreting Actavis as permitting such licensing arrangements despite their
anticompetitive potential).
235. See Hemphill, supra note 233, at 673–82 (advocating the use of FTC
rulemaking to address reverse-payment settlements and discussing the FTC’s
statutory authority to do so).
236. In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
237. Id. at 756.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See McGuire et al., supra note 212, at 1582–83.
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inferences about the merits of cases from prediction markets241 and
the terms of litigation financing agreements.242
Such inferences would raise the same issues as in Actavis. For
instance, an at-risk launch by a generic firm reflects its beliefs about the
likelihood that a court would uphold the patent. Such beliefs, however,
do not provide legal justification for a court holding that the patent is
weak. Feedback effects also complicate the inference. Once firms
recognize that courts will draw inferences from their strategy, more firms
will enter at risk in order to increase their chances of prevailing in the
patent action.243 Thus, a court must recognize that the at-risk launch
serves partly as a signal to the court and must account for this in
drawing inferences about the strength of the patent.
These arguments apply as well to inferences from stock prices.
Stock market investors may predict that a court would hold the
patent to be weak, but this hardly serves as a justification for a court
to do so. Furthermore, if market speculators are aware that courts
will draw inferences from their activity, they will internalize the effects
of these inferences when engaging in market speculation. Thus,
feedback effects will complicate the process of drawing inferences
from stock prices.244
CONCLUSION
Given the pervasiveness of settlement and the potential for abuse,
courts will continue to play an essential role in reviewing settlements.
This is especially true in the context of pharmaceutical patent
settlements, where firms have strong incentives to collude. The
process of reviewing settlements, however, inevitably involves
tradeoffs. Ex post review of the merits is burdensome and may inhibit
the settlement of disputes, however, ex ante review often provides only
241. See MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY: MARKET MECHANISMS FOR PUBLIC
227–28 (2008).
242. See Michael Abramowicz & Omer Alper, Screening Legal Claims Based on ThirdParty Litigation Finance Agreements and Other Signals of Quality, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1641,
1644 (2013) (“We suggest that the legal system allow some claims to proceed and bar
others based on signals of litigation quality gleaned from third-party assessments.”);
Avraham & Wickelgren, supra note 204, at 235 (arguing that the benefits of thirdparty litigation financing “could be enhanced significantly if third-party funding
contracts were allowed to be admissible as evidence in courts”).
243. The situation becomes much more complicated if generic firms also
anticipate that a court will draw an inference about patent weakness in a subsequent
antitrust action. This could discourage generic firms from entering at risk. It is
unclear which of these effects will dominate the generic firm’s decision.
244. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
AND PRIVATE DECISION MAKING
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weak scrutiny. In antitrust cases where a settlement is reviewed in
subsequent litigation, either approach entails making a
counterfactual, post hoc determination of the merits.
In Actavis, the Supreme Court endorsed the use of economic
analysis of settlement terms as a substitute for legal analysis of the
merits. Although the Court’s approach has superficial appeal, it
overlooks key distinctions between the internal and external points of
view. Settlements reflect the litigants’ predictions about how a court
would have resolved their dispute, but such predictions cannot
provide a basis for a legal standard by which the legality of the
settlement is assessed.
The economic approach endorsed in Actavis also ignores the
possibility of feedback effects between the litigants and the court.
The litigants’ incentives change if they are aware that a court will
draw an inference from their settlement, and the court must account
for this in drawing its inference. At a minimum, this requires a much
more sophisticated model than the Court relied on in Actavis.
Economic analysis has deeply enriched our understanding of legal
doctrine and legal institutions, particularly in antitrust law.
Nevertheless, integrating economic and legal reasoning presents real
challenges, particularly when antitrust law intersects with other
doctrinal areas. Economic models are not always compatible with
accepted forms of legal reasoning, and courts may have only a
superficial understanding of the assumptions upon which these
models rely. When economists offer guidance to courts, they should
be conscious of the forms of reasoning that are appropriate for
judges. When judges rely on insights from academic economists, they
should scrutinize the assumptions upon which their models are
based. Developing a coherent solution to the problem of collusive
patent settlements will require more careful attention to the
challenges of combining legal and economic reasoning.

